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We invite contributions, which should be addressed to the Secretary of the Editorial Committee. MSS should be typewritten, double spaced, and proof-read before being submitted. Notes should be gathered at the end of articles, with appropriate references. No MS will be returned unless accompanied by a stamped addressed envelope.

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Editorial

THE recent trade recession has posed many problems for politicians, manufacturers, and consumers. Statesmen have begged the people to loosen their purse-strings and circulate money by spending. But the wary man in the street wants good value for his money. His sales resistance, under continual attack from the advertising profession, has provoked certain manufacturers to suggest that the public exists to buy their products. These claims are unrealistic. In many cases it is just the other way round: the manufacturer exists to produce what the people want and, above all, what they need, at a price they can afford. There is a legitimate profit to be made, but its extent must be carefully scrutinized. It is true that novelties and inventions teach us new necessities, yet we are probably safe in assuming that what must be supplied are existing needs and desires.

What is the relevance of this to the editorial page of a theological journal?

For one thing, a journal is a commercial enterprise of sorts. It must have customers who provide the dollars and cents that pay the costs of production, and these alone. There are no financial profits to be made by the Directors or members of the corporation. Our contributors, we regret to say, are not paid for their articles, though they do receive some off-prints. The reports to the corporation Annual Meeting on 15th May last showed that, in terms of commerce, the *Canadian Journal of Theology* is very much alive. So far as circulation goes, the numbers are remarkably good after almost four full years of existence. On the other hand, our expenses are still not being met by subscriptions. We would like to remind our friends, therefore, that donations would be most welcome. Quite the best thing would be an Endowment Fund to take care of the major cost of printing each year.

Are the customers satisfied with the product?

The answer to that crucial question seems to be that, on the whole, they are pleased with the high quality of theological writing in this *Journal*. There is one important reservation: not enough material is provided that is of immediate relevance to the minister, the priest, the pastor, in their preaching office and their congregational services. Perhaps that is not surprising, for the primary concern of our magazine has always been the discussion of issues at a serious theological level; and theology, alas, is not every man's meat. But the criticism is entirely relevant because we hope to hear the Gospel as it speaks to contemporary problems, to politics, culture, and life as a whole. Our readers have requested more articles of this kind, and the Editorial Committee has already recognized this by the appointment of a committee to solicit manuscripts and to encourage the ministers concerned to write for us. Again, the Committee has adopted the policy of including biblical expositions that may stimulate preachers and pastors, exegetically and also theologically, without spoon-feeding them. We are

bound to report, however, that the supply of articles of the sort we are asked for is quite inadequate. Writers are needed. Manuscripts are hereby invited. We beg our readers to remember the basic aims of the *Journal* and to realize that we can publish homiletical and pastoral material only if it reaches a certain standard. We are grateful for the criticisms that have been offered, and hope that constructive suggestions will continue to flow in. May we invite our readers, in return, to promote the circulation of the *Journal* in their churches and colleges, and among the interested laymen of Canada?

Like many throughout the Christian world Canadians will regret the passing of two distinguished New Testament scholars, of the same name and nationality though not related. Dr. William Manson died in Edinburgh on 4th April, six years after his retirement from the Chair of Biblical Criticism. He had taught previously in Knox College, Toronto, to which he returned as Visiting Professor in 1953-54. He was a meticulous scholar, author of a commentary on St. Luke, an important study of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and other books that have made us all his debtors. It has been announced that his last volume will appear shortly, *The Way of the Cross*, in which his personal devotion to Christ as Saviour finds fullest expression. Dr. T. W. Manson, Rylands Professor of Biblical Criticism and Exegesis in the University of Manchester, died on May 1st at his home in Milnthorpe, Westmoreland. A brilliant scholar at Glasgow and Cambridge in philosophy and classics, he turned to the New Testament and especially to Aramaic and the teaching of our Lord. In *The Teaching of Jesus*, *The Church's Ministry*, *The Servant-Messiah*, *The Sayings of Jesus*, and many articles in the bulletin of the John Rylands Library, Dr. Manson had offered quite significant interpretations. He had rare gifts of imagination and humour, and his fertile research has greatly enriched contemporary New Testament scholarship. When he lectured across Canada a few years ago, he made many friends.

The 150th Anniversary of The British and Foreign Bible Society was celebrated in 1954 and in connexion therewith a new edition of the Society's text of the Greek New Testament was prepared by Dr. G. D. Kilpatrick, Queen's College, Oxford, in collaboration with Dr. Erwin Nestle of the Württemberg Bible Society. Notable features of the new edition, which was published on 7th May, 1958, are improved orthography, the printing of poetical passages as verse, citation of much new evidence including the recently discovered Bodmer papyrus of St. John's Gospel, and the attention paid to the work of British scholars of the period 1904-54. This convenient text is likely to enjoy the same success as its predecessor in the schools and colleges of many lands. Our congratulations to the Editor are the more warm for the knowledge that he would seem to be the first Canadian to edit the text of the Greek New Testament. G.J.

Existentialism and Christian Faith

R. F. HETTLINGER

A RISING young film star who has been publicized as an "Existentialist Pin-up" was recently asked by an interviewer to explain what the word implies. Her reply, while somewhat cryptic, did get to the root of the matter: "Whatever you do, you become." While it is far from adequate as a definition, this is a good starting point for understanding existentialism, which puts its primary emphasis upon the freedom and responsibility of the individual to determine, within limits, his own destiny and character. Jean-Paul Sartre expresses the same principle dramatically in the mouth of Garcin, one of the characters in his play *No Exit*: "A man is what he wills himself to be." And he puts it more philosophically in his essay *L'Existentialisme est un humanisme*: "Man makes himself. He isn't ready made at the start. In choosing his ethics he makes himself, and force of circumstances is such that he can not abstain from choosing one."[1]

Perhaps we shall understand the significance of this emphasis in existentialism if we consider it in relation to three areas of human thought and life in which individuality and responsibility are apt to be minimized or threatened.

1. Philosophy

Modern existentialism began with Kierkegaard's revolt against Hegelian idealism which, he maintained, reduced the individual to a mere aspect of universal history, relieving him of serious responsibility and treating every decisive issue as a matter capable of resolution by abstract thought. Instead of acknowledging that human life consists of frequent choices between alternatives which cannot be logically understood (either/or), idealism sought and claimed to find a method by which all events could be seen to fit into a pattern of reason (both/and). Existentialism declares that truth is to be found in the unique *existence* of each man engaged in living, despite its uncertainties and incongruities, not in the study of *essence* from which all the historical complexities and richness of life have been stripped off. As against all philosophies, from Plato on, which begin from general concepts and absolute ideas, and which consequently find the temporal material world embarrassing and "unreal," existentialism affirms that we must accept the given world with all its problems and limitations as the starting-point of thought. Man must be treated as the unique *person* he is and not reduced to an *object* of thought; he is free and cannot be treated as part of a system or process the character or future of which can be intellectually explained or anticipated.

1. E. T. by Bernard Frechtman, published under the title *Existentialism* (New York, 1947), p. 51.

Man cannot be simply and finally brought under and identified with any law, whether it be promulgated as the law of his nature or as the law of the universe; the rule cannot justify the act nor the person, for only the act justifies the rule, as the paint not the school justifies the painter . . . man cannot be man and be bound, even by himself, and the world is open and cannot be circumvallated by universals and kept snug and safe.[2]

This does not simply mean that existentialism begins from a different philosophical *a priori*; it involves a radically different philosophical method. "Existentialism is an attempt at philosophizing from the standpoint of the actor, instead of, as has been customary, from that of the spectator."[3] The Christian Kierkegaard has this in common with the atheist Nietzsche. "Truth is subjectivity," says Kierkegaard. Nietzsche says, "It makes the most material difference whether a thinker stands personally related to his problems, having his fate, his need and even his highest happiness therein; or merely impersonally, that is to say, if he can only feel and grasp them with the tentacles of cold prying thought."[4]

Existentialists have inevitably been accused of irrationality, because they have thus rejected the traditional assumption of philosophy that by rational analysis we can "make sense" of all experience and reduce the mysterious and the peculiar to order and generality. But they may rightly claim that true reason involves taking into account all the facts of human experience, including the irreducible fact of freedom. Nor have existentialists as a whole proved antagonistic to thought and reflection as such. Jaspers, Marcel and Heidegger have each in different ways attempted an intellectual analysis of the existentialist position. Their purpose, however, is not the construction of rational edifices such as those of Aristotle or Aquinas but "reflection upon intensely lived experience." In this, surely, the existentialist is recalling to us a basically Biblical and Christian position. We might say that John 7:17 would serve as a text for the existentialist approach to knowledge and truth: "If any man willeth to do his will he shall know of the doctrine, whether it is of God." For the Bible does not present us with a philosophical or theological system, but with certain unique events as the self-revelation of God; and it calls us to a response of faith which involves decision, trust and risk. Kierkegaard was surely right in his attack on any system—even "Christendom"—which reduces faith to assent, domesticates God, and claims to offer to man objective evidences sufficient to prove the truth. The Christian must be prepared to believe even when he is "out upon the seventy thousand fathoms of water."

2. Science

One general tendency in scientific thought has been that of explaining, or trying to explain, the phenomenon of human personality in terms of the

2. H. J. Blackham, *Six Existentialist Thinkers*, pp. 159–160.
3. E. L. Allen, *Existentialism from Within*, p. 3.
4. Quoted by Blackham, *op. cit.*, pp. 23–24.

physical world. Man is regarded as the end-term in a process of evolution, his thoughts and feelings are regarded as the reflection of physical change, his conscious life is said to be determined by the unconscious over which he has no effective control. In one way or another all these interpretations of man (not, of course, based squarely on objective scientific knowledge but characteristic of the "scientific age") depersonalize him. In contrast existentialists emphasize the distinctions between the human person and the world of nature. The latter is ruled by predetermined principles and is incapable of free choices; the former has freedom and responsibility and can rightly use the natural world for his purposes. Man is subject, the world is object.[5] Sartre regards Freud's determinism as one of the worst examples of the depersonalization of man, for in thinking of himself as bound by the unconscious the individual is able to excuse his failures and to avoid the full responsibility for his choices. We think of ourselves as cowardly not because we have made cowardly choices but because we were conditioned to this by unwise treatment in infancy. But the existentialist says that "the coward makes himself cowardly, [that] the hero makes himself heroic. There's always a possibility for the coward not to be cowardly any more and for the hero to stop being heroic."[6] Once again, the Christian must surely welcome any movement which reaffirms the uniqueness and responsibility of man over against a naturalistic determinism.

3. Society

The existentialists have also drawn attention to the widespread tendency of modern social life to reduce the individual to a mere number or "hand" or "unit." Marcel points out how easily people are identified with their functions. A man is not primarily a human person with all the richness and diversity of personality; he is a railwayman, a civil servant, a schoolmaster —and all his other activities are treated as aspects of this abstract definition. Even when he retires he is regarded in terms of his function—a retired doctor, civil servant, etc. The effect of all this is to encourage the individual to hide behind generalizations and to abdicate his proper responsibilities. He thinks of himself as one of the crowd, part of mankind, absorbed in "the public." He excuses himself from the exercise of his unique freedom because "it's human nature" to do this or that, because "everybody does it." He thus ceases to be a human person and falls back into the sub-human world; he becomes a thing.

5. Some existentialists (e.g., Heidegger) can certainly be criticized for speaking as if the natural world were *merely* instrumental to man's purpose, and it is a weakness of Christian existentialists (e.g., Bultmann) that they tend to ignore the place of the created order in the redemptive purpose of God (Romans 8:19–23). See the comments of Ernst Lohmeyer in *Kerygma and Myth*, ed. Bartsch, pp. 128, 133.

6. Sartre, *op. cit.*, pp. 41–42. This raises an important question as to Sartre's consistency. My colleague Dr. Alden D. Kelley points out to me that it could well be argued, on the basis of some passages in Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* that he has merely replaced the psychological determinism of Freud by a determinism according to which all our choices are conditioned by past choices.

Existentialists recognize that the majority of people live in this way, in what Heidegger calls "fallenness" or "inauthentic existence," and they regard it as their task to awaken them to the truth, to challenge them to "authentic existence." This explains in part the gloomy and almost nauseating picture of human life which so many of Sartre's plays present to us. They are not intended to be a representation of life as it should be but as (in the existentialist view) it actually is, in order that the observer may be shocked into recognizing the futility and inadequacy of a less than fully responsible existence. This dramatic procedure undoubtedly involves a certain distortion and exaggeration. Very few living people are altogether as debased as some of Sartre's characters, and he gives some justification to the popular impression that existentialism is "a clandestine wedding of nordic melancholy with Parisian pornography."[7] Moreover Sartre and other existentialists can rightly be criticized for minimizing the positive and healthy elements in human life—birth, children, love. But they would claim that it is only by isolating one side of the truth that people can be shaken into action and redeemed from inauthentic to authentic existence. And the Christian can take heart from the fact that secular thought is again coming to recognize, even though imperfectly, the truth of the doctrine of the fall. Indeed one reviewer has described the latest book by Albert Camus[8] as "a contemporary version of the third chapter of Genesis."

The existentialist does not only believe in sin, however. He believes also in redemption. There is hope for man because even in the depths of his dehumanization and bondage he retains an awareness of the authentic existence which is his right and privilege, and his "conscience" will not allow him altogether to ignore the radical defects of his present life.

It is at this point, however, that the existentialists, at least the non-Christian existentialists,[9] depart most radically from the Christian view of man. "Man's destiny is within himself," says Sartre.[10] Freedom is within the capacity of man if he will choose it, quite apart from any act of divine grace or redemption. This optimism about man must not be confused with the liberal or even the Marxist view of history or mankind as self-redeeming. All such ideas subordinate the individual to the race or to the class or to history and justify man only in the mass. The existentialist affirms, paradoxically, that it is only when the individual comes to terms with the certain fact of his extinction in death and the ultimate meaninglessness of his life that he finds freedom. When he gives up seeking for exterior justifications

7. Carl Michalson, *Christianity and the Existentialists* (New York, 1956), p. 2.
8. *The Fall.* See *Theology Today*, July, 1957, pp. 259–260.
9. In this paper, which is intended to serve as a general introduction to the subject, no attempt has been made to distinguish in detail among different writers to whom the title "existentialist" has been applied, sometimes (as in the case of Marcel) without their approval. The differences between them are considerable and important, but it is the contention of this paper that there remains a distinct and definable "existentialist" approach to life and thought. See Frederick Copleston, S.J., *Contemporary Philosophy* (London, 1956), pp. 125–126.
10. *Op. cit.*, p. 42.

of his individuality in terms of the future of humanity or of the Church he can begin to live. When he chooses to live and act (rather than to commit suicide) *even though life has no meaning* he can exercise his freedom responsibly. Sartre has said, "We were never so free as in the Resistance"—a time when by all normal standards life was strictly circumscribed. What he means is that in the French "underground" life was lived in the present without either hope or fear for what the next day might bring, and therefore men lived and died without the normal restraints of tradition, morality or prudence. "Authentic personal existence is a synthesis of the imposed and the willed, and the synthesis is achieved by taking up the imposed into the willed: I will my own past and the world as it is given in the immediate circumstances and in its ultimate interpretation, and with my will self-determined in this way I choose from the possibilities which remain open."[11]

The word used in Danish and German for the sense of ultimate meaninglessness, the acknowledgment of which sets man free, can best be translated "dread." It represents the serious and honest facing of what most people hide from themselves—the fact that human life comes up against "a fundamental metaphysical insecurity; not dread of anything in particular, but the dread which comes over us if we realize that in the last resort the moral and theoretical props by which we have supported ourselves go down, and we are faced with—*Nothingness*."[12] For the Christian this recognition that all human activity and thought and pleasure are in themselves transitory and empty corresponds to the religious confession, "Our hearts are restless till they find their rest in Thee," and is to be welcomed. At least the existentialists have come to a point beyond the self-satisfied liberal optimism of the pre-war period; but, unhappily, for many of them the theistic solution to man's sense of insecurity is excluded because they will not accept the ultimate limitation of human independence which is involved in belief in God. There are, however, indications that existentialism may not be so closed to a religious solution as some of its exponents affirm. Sartre does indeed claim that "existentialism is nothing else than an attempt to draw all the consequences of a coherent atheistic position" and asserts that "even if God did exist, that would change nothing."[13] But on the other hand there may be more possibility of openness to the Gospel in a scheme of thought which denies the relevance of God than in one which gives a man a false God, whether Marxist or humanist.

Existentialism does not put Jesus in the manger or Christ on the middle Cross, but it will put nothing else there either. This is its Christian advantage over such religious philosophies as Stoicism, which with all its pious language and self-sufficient world-view in almost every detail rendered the Christian faith superfluous. . . . Existentialism nurses an aching void, keeps the wounds of man

11. Blackham, *op. cit.*, pp. 98–99, summarizing Heidegger.
12. Dorothy Emmet in the *Supplement* to the *Christian News-Letter*, October 1st, 1947, p. 11.
13. *Op. cit.*, pp. 60–61.

open until an authentically healing agent can be applied . . . sponsors what the poet Holderlin called "a holy emptiness" which turns its atheism into a wistful stretching out for reality[14].

The fact that existentialism points beyond its own categories is expressly recognized by Jaspers who, although rejecting the authoritative answers of Christian doctrine, criticizes positivism for its denial of the transcendent. Many readers of Heidegger maintain that, despite himself, his thought implies a religious solution. And, of course, such writers as Gabriel Marcel and Paul Tillich have shown that many basic existentialist insights can be used to illuminate the Christian understanding of man. But it remains true that the most notable exponents of this philosophy, even when they come close to Christian truth in their *diagnosis* of man's ills depart radically from it in their prescription for their *cure*. Both Sartre and Heidegger, for example (while they differ as to whether death is the fulfilment or negation of life) agree that the fact of death must be taken seriously. To live in the face of inevitable death is to be set free from the pursuit of earthly possessions and from the tyranny of public opinion; it means to be delivered from false hopes and fears and makes possible a real life in freedom. There is a profound Christian truth in this, for St. Paul argues in Romans 6 that the Christian is set free to live unto God because he has been identified with Christ in a death to sin. But the non-Christian existentialist parts company with St. Paul not only in rejecting the hope of resurrection as unrealistic but even more fundamentally in rejecting the whole idea of Christ as the embodiment and saviour of mankind. No other person can really make any difference to my individual situation. There is no such thing as "human nature" in the mind of God because if there were it would delimit my individual freedom; there cannot be any salvation of mankind in Christ because each individual is self-determined.[15] Man is his own creator and must be his own saviour. Thus when existentialism in its secular form is laid bare it is seen to offer no gospel to man living his inauthentic existence. We may, and should, welcome and make use of many existentialist insights but we must recognize that unbaptized into Christ it represents "man's extreme effort in the direction of self-sufficiency, his ultimate striving to rise above the void into which he is thrown . . . despairing man's last endeavour to be superior to his destiny."[16]

14. Michalson, *op. cit.*, pp. 21–22.

15. The excessive individualism of many existentialists has often been noted. Dorothy Emmet in the *Supplement* to the *C.N-L.* quoted above remarks that "they sometimes use language which suggests that it does not much matter what you choose, so long as you have the courage to choose and not to rat on it" (p. 14). But this implies a complete indifference to the interests and demands of family, nation, etc.

16. John MacQuarrie, *An Existentialist Theology*, p. 195. MacQuarrie is speaking of Heidegger in particular, but his words are applicable to many others.

Logical Analysis, Theological Positivism, and Metaphysics

C. DOUGLAS JAY

As the prospect for mankind becomes increasingly uncertain, some who are concerned about the fate of modern philosophy have been led to inquire into the possible relation between the "abolition of man" in common life and the rejection of metaphysics in academic life.[1] This is not to say that the contemporary revolution in philosophy is responsible for the present crisis in human affairs, for that would imply that philosophic theory has exercised a far greater influence on the general public than it ever has. But it is arguable that the increasing loss of freedom and of such social virtues as tolerance is the effect not simply of a particular school of philosophy but of the widespread scepticism as to the power of the mind to know reality, which characterizes the modern world. This general scepticism has been promoted to some extent by positivistic trends in philosophic schools, but it may be equally true that the schools have reflected the general ethos. At any rate, it appears that many of those whose business it is to deal with ideas at the popular level—journalists, social workers and the products of teachers' colleges, for example—simply assume that in matters of religion and morals there is no fundamental encounter with reality, and that the question of a truth claim does not arise. Since metaphysics involves a robust belief that truth can be known about realities which transcend mundane experience, and since belief in human freedom also assumes that man can come to terms with the real, it may not be accidental that the denial of metaphysics has coincided with an age which is progressively denying human freedom.

It may not be accidental either that a theological movement which shares this scepticism about man's ability to treat ultimate questions has also coincided with the denial of metaphysics. If we cannot say anything significant or meaningful about the transcendent, the only way to avoid complete agnosticism is for the transcendent to reveal itself in some way distinctly different from our own forms of thought. It is shown to be different by the fact that the faith which alone can receive revelation is dependent upon a confession of our utter incompetence in the face of ultimate questions. "The negative point of contact," writes Brunner, "is a consciousness of vital need . . . " "But faith is certain that revelation alone enables us rightly to apprehend that need, that vital incapacity, which is the presupposition of faith; and that thereby revelation itself begets its own presupposition in the

1. Cf. N. A. Scott, "Poetry and the Crisis of Metaphysics," in *The Christian Scholar*, vol. 36, No. 4, Dec. 1953.

crucial sense."[2] This leaves us of course without any real point of contact between the mind to which faith in revelation has been given and the mind to which it has not. Thus we have a theological positivism as a counterpart of philosophical positivism; on this account, revelation is *sui generis*—no philosophical enquiry can be strictly relevant to it, for reason and revelation cannot meet. Indeed, there can be no analogies between revelation and any form of thought and experience. Man's duty, as Barth interprets it, is not to seek truth but to render obedience.

It is not surprising that some "crisis theologians" actually welcome the philosophical attack upon metaphysics on the ground that it frees theology from the danger of invasion by philosophical speculation, and that it may lead man to that confession of incapacity which Brunner has declared to be the precondition of faith. This welcoming of philosophical scepticism as an ally of faith is not without precedent; even David Hume contended that "to be a philosophical sceptic is, in a man of letters, the first and most essential step towards being a sound, believing Christian."[3] One finds an echo of this in the Foreword of the recent Canadian publication *The Light and the Flame* where, after a description of the abdication of the attempt to answer ultimate questions on the part of much contemporary philosophy, it is affirmed that this opens the door to theology to treat such questions: "Philosophy's necessity is theology's opportunity."[4] Again, in a recent collection of essays by scholars who have in common an indebtedness to the philosophy of analysis and a concern for theological questions, Thomas McPherson contends that positivists may be the enemies of theology but the friends of religion. "By showing, in their own way, the absurdity of what theologians try to utter, positivists have helped to suggest that religion belongs to the sphere of the unutterable." By clarifying its true nature, positivists have "done a service to religion."[5]

It is important to note, however, that the contemporary philosophical position we have to consider is no longer accurately described as logical positivism but rather as logical analysis (or logical empiricism or linguistic analysis), and that both positions differ from the empiricism of Hume. Hume represents the first stage of the modern empiricist challenge to religious belief. Here the attack was directed in the main against natural or rational theology. Hume reasoned that arguments which start from an empirical premise can yield only a probable conclusion and therefore God's necessary existence cannot be proved. Natural theology is thus a mistake; the Christian cannot *prove* his faith—and many have welcomed Hume's own conclusion that religion finds its "best and most solid foundation in faith and divine revelation."

The next phase of empiricism, represented by the logical positivists, was

2. *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 20.
3. *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, ed. N. K. Smith, 1947, p. 228.
4. R. C. Chalmers and J. A. Irving (eds.), p. xi.
5. "Religion as the Inexpressible," in *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*, p. 141.

more radical. The function of philosophy is here interpreted to be not that of distinguishing true assertions from false ones, but meaningful assertions from meaningless ones. According to their verification principle, a statement is literally meaningful if and only if it is either analytic or empirically verifiable. We are restricted by this principle to two kinds of assertions: to be meaningful, either they must be matter-of-fact sentences such as those of science and common sense which can be verified by ordinary sense perception, or they must be mere tautologies which cannot be confuted by experience. All other assertions are dismissed as nonsense; that is, they cannot be verified by appeal to sense experience and are therefore without significance. Obviously, this will include all statements of metaphysics, ethics or theology. Logical positivists thus challenged not the arguments by which religious beliefs were supported but their very claim to significance. No statement about either the existence or the non-existence of God could be meaningful because it lacks "literal" or "factual" meaning.

It became apparent, however, that the methodological principle of logical positivism itself could not be defended on this basis, and that the meaning of "meaning" had been too arbitrarily restricted. Thus a third stage of empiricism has emerged, in which propositions are no longer simply classified as meaningful or meaningless, but are classified into different categories according to their particular logical form. Instead of ruling out theological propositions *a priori* as meaningless, the logical analyst asks, "What is the logic of theological statements?" or "What is the function of God-propositions?"

It is important that philosophers of religion today recognize that they now have to contend not with logical positivism but with this later development, lest they be as wide of the mark as Joad's *Critique of Logical Positivism* now is. The contemporary philosopher defines his task as that of neutral analysis. He is willing to concede meaning to sentences which do not state facts—moral judgments, for instance. If they are not statements of fact, he will try to show what kind of statements they are. The result of this philosophy, as Wittgenstein has said, "is not a number of 'philosophical propositions,' but to make propositions clear."[6]

Let us grant at once that the philosophy of analysis has had real utility for the study of religion. It has clarified our understanding of the profound logical differences between the scientific and the religious uses of language; and the Christian philosopher and theologian will ignore these differences at his peril. The Christian may learn from Gilbert Ryle's *Concept of Mind*, for instance, to expect Christian language to display a logical complexity appropriate to its theme. Contemporary philosophers have changed the emphasis from epistemology to semantics. Instead of asking, "How can we know and how can our knowledge be validated?" they ask, "How is it possible to express what we know, and to what extent is our knowledge

6. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Kegan Paul, London, 1922, p. 77.

limited by our means of expression?"[7] As Professor Urban has suggested, it is another way of stating the Kantian problem.

> Our language, made to deal with the material world, the world of phenomena, has constantly been extended for discourse about the noumenal. Kant asked the question whether knowledge in this sphere is possible. He might just as well have asked whether discourse about such objects is meaningful or intelligible.[8]

The philosophical emphasis on semantics has compelled theologians to reckon seriously with the general problem of language as a vehicle of knowledge, and the particular problem of how finite man can talk about the infinite and transcendent God. Theologians have traditionally dealt with the problem by resorting to analogy. We say that God is personal, that He is like a father who loves his children. When the philosophical analyst examines this analogy, however, as do Antony Flew and Ian Crombie in *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*,[9] he exposes the dangers of analogical thinking. When he asks how facts of evil are compatible with belief in God's fatherly love, we qualify the analogy by saying that God's love is not a merely human love, or that it is inscrutable. But this is to "erode" the analogy as Flew puts it. When confronted with apparently contradictory evidence, the Christian modifies his analogies but allegedly does not admit that any evidence can finally falsify his belief. But if theological doctrines cannot be discounted by any evidence whatever, if they cannot be tested by any generally accepted procedure, the philosophical analyst wants to know how they can be accepted as assertions about reality. Are they not rather expressions of attitude, for instance?

The theologian of course cannot yield at this point. He may agree with Ryle that theological assertions are characterized by a different, more complex logic than scientific assertions, but he insists that they refer to a reality "behind the scenes." The theologian is inescapably committed to the crucial metaphysical position that though religious language uses analogies from the spatio-temporal realm, there must be situations not restricted to the spatio-temporal elements they contain. If this claim that there are facts besides what is observed (seen, heard, touched, tasted and smelt) is to be expressed, however, it will require language that from the standpoint of perception is logically odd and complex. The theologian ought to learn this lesson from the logical analyst, that if he is to claim that certain situations are not exhausted by what is perceived—and that these are the characteristically religious situations—the language in which he expresses this claim will be characterized by logical improprieties as compared with perceptual language. And if theological statements really are odd and complex in this sense, it may be that an analysis that is geared to straight-

7. *Vide* W. G. Pollard, "An Inquiry into the Status of Non-Conceptual Experience," *The Christian Scholar*, vol. 38, No. 1, March 1955.
8. *Language and Reality* (Allen and Unwin, London, 1939), p. 15.
9. Pp. 96ff. Cf. A. MacIntyre, *Metaphysical Beliefs*, pp. 181 ff.

forward sense assertion can never do justice to them, especially to their claim to assert something about transcendent reality. As Basil Mitchell has observed, "an analysis tailor-made to current philosophical fashions may prove dangerously constricting. In the interests of logical classification the Faith may be drastically distorted."[10]

The logical analyst will likely object here that we are still confusing him with the logical positivist. He admits that logical positivism had a metaphysic; but he himself claims to approach theological assertions with no such bias but with only a method of analysis, and is quite prepared to grant that they may be meaningful. But does he grant that theological sentences are able to be not only meaningful but *true*? For the theologian and the metaphysician this is the crux of the matter; and we must ask with Michael Foster, "Unless modern philosophers concede this also, are they so far removed from Logical Positivism as they claim to be?"[11] And indeed, can the philosophy of analysis avoid metaphysical assumptions any more than any other philosophy? Some of its advocates contend that their method leads to poetry and what Professor John Irving has defined as "syntactical mysticism.[12]" Is not this itself a metaphysical position?[13] It may be that there is no single metaphysic assumed by philosophers of analysis; the contributors to *New Essays in Philosophical Theology* seem to demonstrate that the method is compatible with a number of basic positions. We have conceded that it may have a creative relation to the Christian faith. But we must continue to be wary of anything approaching an alliance with a reductive type of philosophy which rules out metaphysics, if our contention above is valid that theology cannot avoid concern with metaphysical questions. If metaphysical utterance is rendered meaningless because it cannot be verified so must theological utterance, if it purports to say something about reality. In spite of their claims to neutrality, it appears that in the main the philosophers of analysis in effect rule out the possibility of language bearing any valid transcendental reference. And this affects biblical religion and theology as radically as it affects metaphysics.

We dare to suggest then that there is something radically wrong with the logical analysts' interpretation of language. They have rightly warned of the dangers of an analogical use of language; but is such a use not inescapable in the end? Croce, writing in 1901 before Russell's *Principia Mathematica*, declared that all language is metaphorical, or none is.[14] Croce was no more a religious philosopher than are most philosophers of analysis, but he points to their fundamental error about the nature of language itself

10. "Modern Philosophy and Theology," *The Socratic* (Blackwell, Oxford, 1952), pp. 9–10.
11. *Mystery and Philosophy* (SCM, London, 1957), p. 15n.
12. J. A. Irving, "Logical Analysis and Mysticism" in *The Light and the Flame*, p. 104.
13. Cf. Urban, *op. cit.*, p. 630; "The theory of meaning which denies meaning to metaphysical propositions is itself a metaphysic."
14. Indeed, as Urban, Cassirer and Emmet have pointed out, symbol and analogy are indispensable even in scientific constructions.

which is crucial for Christian thinkers; for this theory of language fails to explain the kind of experience that to the Christian is of central importance.

Urban contends that the rejection of metaphysics by modern philosophy was brought on by an increasing literalism, a failure to recognize the inevitably metaphorical character of all language, and that metaphysical statements in particular cannot be reduced to literal truth.[15] Though the logical analysts do not rule out metaphysical statements *a priori* as did the logical positivists, they still try to analyse them in literal terms. Urban maintains that the solution is rather to recognize the metaphorical character of metaphysical and religious utterance, and upholds the "root metaphor theory of metaphysics." On this account there is a fundamental type of metaphor that is taken from the "primary and irreducible domains" of experience. Metaphysics may take as its fundamental category such a concept as "life" or "mind," but these terms will be used metaphorically. This view of the nature of language is radically opposed to that of contemporary linguistic analysts; and if language is metaphorical to anything like the extent that it suggests, religious statements must be analysed on a basis very different from that provided by modern philosophic techniques. And this would be so, not just because of the peculiar character of religious language but because all language as such resists reduction to a purely literal meaning, or to purely univocal discourse. Professor Geddes MacGregor has compared language with music. No one doubts that there is such a thing as musical analysis; but no one suggests that music can be interpreted by any sort of mathematical analysis. Music is more susceptible to mathematical treatment than is any living language; but its meaning will always transcend such an analysis. Similarly, while language has its grammar and its logic, there is in language "a fundamentally unanalysable element" as Professor MacGregor puts it. "Language reveals, and at the same time partially conceals, a life that lies beyond it."[16] In similar vein, Urban declares that

> myth is indispensable from the standpoint of expression and intelligibility. Myth is dramatic language and only dramatic language is ultimately intelligible . . . it was precisely the recognition on the part of Plato that cosmologically significant propositions could not be expressed in mathematical-logical language, which led him to resort to the dramatic language of myth. It was not that this language is an imperfect pre-scientific form, to be abandoned for the mathematical-logical; it was rather a clear recognition of the essential limitations of the latter.[17]

Myth, metaphor and analogy are not literally true, and therefore cannot stand the test of the logical analyst. But this is not to say that they are untrue. The language of theology does not have literal significance for it

15. *Op. cit.*, p. 721.
16. "The Nature of Religious Utterance," in *The Christian Scholar*, vol. 38, No. 3, p. 174.
17. *Op. cit.*, p. 593.

retains the fundamentally dramatic character of religious language;[18] but it does not follow that it has no significance at all, as a vehicle of truth. The philosophy of analysis tends to assume that all thinking consists in solving problems; but as Michael Foster maintains "there is another kind of thinking which depends on the revealing of a mystery."[19] And if reality reveals itself in unique dramatic manifestations, how else can this truth be communicated but through dramatic language, the language of indirect communication?

Although the language of philosophy will never be the same as the language of theology, philosophy must "find language adequate for the expression of all forms of experience," as Urban puts it.[20] Nor can theologians afford to neglect the human word any more than the divine word; they must be concerned with the problem of the validity of religious and theological language, with its capacity to express in some way the truth about our relation to a reality beyond ourselves which ultimately concerns us. And if Urban is right in saying that "the problems of the philosophy of language culminate in the problem of the language of metaphysics . . . The meaningfulness of the other languages always depends upon the meaningfulness of metaphysical language . . ."[21] then in respect of its language, the possibility of theology is bound up with the possibility of metaphysics. It may be possible for art and science to go on doing their work without raising metaphysical questions, but it is not possible for theology.[22]

The theological positivist may object at this point that religious language is altogether different from any other language, that the language of revelation must be meaningless to the philosopher or to anyone except through a special miracle of grace. We have agreed that it may be logically more complex; but we must now add that it is not *altogether* different from other language. Theologians as well as philosophers of analysis have misunderstood the nature of religious language and language in general. As Alasdair MacIntyre reminds us, religious language uses familiar words with familiar meanings put to a special use, but with no merely private significance. "A special miracle of grace might be bound up with finding biblical assertions acceptable or important . . . but could not be involved in finding them meaningful."[23]

Further, we reiterate that the question of the meaningfulness of language

18. Otherwise, as Urban points out, "theology would lose its touch with religion" (*ibid.*, p. 576). And again, "Even where, as in theology, [religious] language approaches the logical character of science and the abstractness of metaphysics, it must still retain its poetic elements. God may be a logician . . . but his relation to the universe and to man can never be expressed in a merely . . . logical form. It is for this reason that theology, which seeks to systematize these relations must, in its reasoning, as well as in its descriptions, be dramatic in character; otherwise it could not communicate its meanings" (*ibid.*, pp. 581–582).

19. *Mystery and Philosophy*, p. 18 *et passim.*

20. *Op. cit.*, p. 627.

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 629–630.

22. *Vide* D. Emmet, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

23. *Metaphysical Beliefs*, p. 176.

must never be divorced from the question of the relation of language to reality. We venture to suggest that both theological positivists and logical analysts have tended to become so preoccupied with explicating the meaning of words—divine and human—that they have neglected the fundamental question of the relation of words to the reality of which they originally purport to speak. Our contention is that when this question is raised, it is discovered that the only adequate words are fundamentally analogical, and that the philosophy of analysis fails to do justice to analogical language even though it may concede that it belongs to a separate category.

The philosophy of analysis will, however, continue to serve theology in forcing it to reckon with both the importance of analogy in religious language, and the dangers that beset its use. It will caution theologians to reflect on their grounds for using a particular analogy, and on the way it is used; a scriptural image cannot be removed from context without changing its significance, for instance. Further, no one image or analogy will ever be sufficient of itself; as Basil Mitchell has suggested, "it may be that a number are needed, each inadequate in a different way."[24] The theologian must remember, however, that he cannot avoid the dangers of analogical language by trying to translate metaphors into univocal language on the supposition that this is more accurate knowledge. Religious knowledge can never have this kind of lucidity; but taken as a whole, it may represent more truth about reality than any other kind.

24. *The Socratic*, p. 10.

The Invisibility of God and the Incarnation

J. JOCZ

AT the centre of the controversy between Church and Synagogue stands the christological question. This is not a question whether Jesus is the Messiah, but whether the Christian understanding of the Messiah is admissible in view of the Jewish concept of God. Here lies the dividing line between Judaism and the Church. On this point neither can afford to compromise. This is the reason why an Unitarian form of Christianity is a contradiction in terms; at best it can be a Gentile Synagogue, but it can never be the Church. It is important, however, to remember that christology to the Church is not an abstract theological subject which can be discussed on purely theoretical lines. It is not that christology was first formulated and then adjusted to fit the case of Jesus of Nazareth. The process was the reverse: the Church defined her christology in view of Jesus Christ. He must remain at the centre of Christian thinking: otherwise it ceases to be Christian. For the Christian theologian the question is therefore not an academic one but a matter of faith. The Jew is in a different position. He can afford to treat the subject theoretically without involving himself in a statement of faith. This "advantage" on the part of the Jewish scholar gives an appearance of logicality which is of necessity lacking on the Christian side where faith is already assumed in the argument.

The christology of the Church is essentially Johannine. Without the Fourth Gospel even the Pauline Epistles would not have sufficed as a basis for the Trinitarian doctrine we have today. Admittedly, Col. 2:9 comes very close to a Trinitarian view but this and similar texts in the Pauline corpus could have been viewed as an exaggeration on the part of an enthusiast, had they not been backed by the Johannine biography of the life of the Logos. We will not go far wrong when we say that the starting-point of the Church's christology is the sentence: *verbum caro factum est* (John 1:14). With this utterance we find ourselves in the heart of the Fourth Gospel; all that follows is a description of how *truly* the Word became flesh. This means that for St. John, the Gospel is not what Jesus said or did, but what He was—the Incarnate Word of God. The words and deeds of Jesus of Nazareth derive their importance from the fact that He is the Son of God.[1] In the Johannine usage *Son of God* and *Word of God* are synonymous and refer to the historic person of Jesus the Messiah.

In this essay it is our purpose to relate the peculiar Christian doctrine of the Incarnation to the concept of the invisibility of God.

1. On this subject, see the author's essay in *Judaica*, III, 1957, "The Son of God."

I. The Synagogue's Position

Christian theologians seldom pay any attention to the views of the Synagogue. This is a definite loss to the Church, for she understands her own position best when confronted with Judaism. Furthermore, the Synagogue is the Church's only legitimate partner in the discussion: *Cur Deus homo*? She, the historic guardian of ethical monotheism, has a special right to question the Church regarding the Trinity. For the Synagogue this questioning is not a matter of curiosity but of conscience. The honour of the God of Israel is involved in it. The Synagogue therefore asks with some insistence: How does the Church hold a monotheistic faith in view of her Trinitarian position?

Judaism points to the Second Commandment which follows with logical sequence upon the First, namely, that the One and Only God must of necessity remain the invisible God. Judaism deduces God's invisibility from His spirituality. This is the reason why He cannot be represented by any visible form of the created order, as He is incommensurate with it.

The Synagogue's teaching regarding the invisibility of God has an interesting history. In it is revealed the distance between the God of revelation and the god of philosophy.

By way of illustration we shall start with a classical example from the Torah. In Ex. 33:11 God is represented as speaking to Moses *panim el panim* (face to face). This expression was felt by Jewish commentators to be an embarrassing anthropomorphism. Targum Onkelos therefore tries to soften the impression by using the *Hitpael* form in the rendering of the text, and this makes it appear that God spoke to Himself but in the *presence* of Moses. The medieval Jewish commentator Rashi follows the Targum's example in order to circumvent the difficulty.[2] But the anthropomorphism is by no means the only difficulty in this text; the real difficulty arises from the context which contradicts the statement about Moses' vision of God *panim el panim*. First, God's glory which Moses asks to see is equated with God's "goodness" (Ex. 33:19); then, the text tells us that Moses was placed in a position from which he could only see the "back;" finally, what was meant to be a vision turns out to be an audition in which the so-called thirteen *middot* (attributes) are announced; and worst of all, verse 11 is flatly contradicted by verse 20 which states that no man can see God and live.

Whatever the history of the text, the complex theophany can only be understood from the characteristic biblical concept of revelation which implies an encounter with God, but at a distance, and only by mediation. What hinders man from approaching is not His invisibility but His holiness. To the ancient Hebrew, God was not a philosophical concept but an awesome and terrifying *Presence*. Man cannot see God, not because He is a rarefied Spirit, but because flesh and blood cannot endure Him with

2. Cf. M. Rosenblum and A. M. Silberman, *Pentateuch* (1930), p. 188.

immunity. That God is a *real* Presence could not be doubted by the Hebrew.

The ancient Synagogue still reckoned with the possibility of a concrete encounter with God by means of the *shekinah*: *reot pene shekinah*—to see the face of the *Shekinah*—meant to appear in the Presence of God. The rabbis held to the view that every man, be he good or bad, had ultimately to meet God *panim el panim* at the hour of death. But for those who are righteous is reserved the perfect vision of God which is the consummation of all bliss.[3] It is thus obvious that to them an encounter with God was more than a mere mental realization of God; it meant a real and personal *vis-à-vis* meeting of God and man. Though most of the rabbis were well versed in mystical lore, their sense of God's holiness and their knowledge of man's sinfulness prevented them from seeking the unitive experience of the mystic. They regarded it as a dangerous path leading to destruction. It is said, that of the four men who "entered the Garden" only R. Akiba managed to return unhurt.[4]

The God of the ancient Synagogue is anything but a mental concept, nor is his invisibility a philosophical postulate. He is invisible only because the human eye cannot endure His splendour. The Talmud tells the legend how Hadrian the Emperor asked Yehoshua b. Hananya (*ca.* 90 A.D.): "I would like to see your God." Yehoshua replied: "You cannot see him." The Emperor said: "Indeed, I must see him." Then the rabbi took Hadrian and placed him in the full blaze of the sun and said to him: "Look into it"; he answered: "I cannot"; Yehoshua replied: "If of the sun you say 'I cannot look at it,' which is only one of the servants who stand in the presence of God, how much more is it true of the *shekinah*?"[5]

We want to quote one more passage to illustrate our point. The *Pesikta Rabba* comments on Ps. 92:6: "How great are thy works, O Lord! Thy thoughts are very deep"—"Come and see the miracles of God . . . He created this world; he created men and demons (*mazzikim*); the demons see men but men see them not. He created demons and Servant Angels, the Servant Angels see the demons, but the demons see not the Servant Angels. He created Servant Angels, demons and men: He sees all, but all his creatures see him not. Say then: Thy thoughts are very deep!"[6] From this we can gauge what the invisibility of God meant to the rabbis: His blinding glory makes Him invisible to his creatures' eyes. They thus cry out: "Who is like the God of gods? Who sees and cannot be seen!"[7]

In the Old Testament the awareness of God's splendour is magnificently symbolized by the behaviour of the Seraphim covering not only their faces but their bodies with their wings so as not to be seared by God's holiness (Is. 6:2).

3. For the whole subject see Herman L. Strack and Paul Billerbeck, *Kommentar zum N.T. aus Talmud und Midrasch*, I, 206 ff.
4. Cf. *Babylonian Talmud*, Hagigah, 14b.
5. *Ibid.*, Hullin 59b, Engl.
6. Pesikta R. 6.
7. Deutr. R. 1.

It was only under Greek influence and by slow degrees that God's presence became conceptualized in the Synagogue. This led to conceiving the invisibility of God as a philosophical postulate. Before the Greek world, biblical anthropomorphism was felt to be an embarrassing feature. It had to be explained apologetically. Here is a typical example: "The King (i.e., Ptolomaeus Philometor) asked in what sense the Scriptures ascribe to God hands, arms, face, feet, walking. He (i.e., Aristobulus) explained it to him in keeping with the divine nature of God."[8] We can rest assured that the "explanation" was in keeping with Greek philosophical ideas more than with the "divine nature of God."

This need for "explaining" may perhaps be compared to our modern need for "demythologizing," and it is interesting to note where it led to. The greatest protagonist in explaining the Bible and Judaism to the Greek world was undoubtedly Philo of Alexandria. He may not have succeeded in working out a synthesis between Greek philosophy and biblical faith, but towards the process of ratiocination he made a major contribution. Here is Philo's philosophical definition of God: a Being better than Good, more honourable than Unity, purer than the number One. God cannot be seen by anyone else, because he can only be comprehended by Himself.[9] It is obvious that "seeing" for Philo is a mental act, whereas for the rabbis of the ancient Synagogue, as for the Old Testament, seeing God is an encounter.

With the medieval Jewish philosophers the process of rationalizing is completed. The impact of Greek and Arab thought proved irresistible. God is now a completely spiritualized *concept* to be apprehended mentally. It would lead us too far to quote the evidence. But the central figure of medieval Jewish philosophy must not be passed over.

Moses Maimonides occupies a special place in Judaism. His influence extends far beyond the field of philosophy. His contribution to the general thinking of the Synagogue makes him one of the most outstanding leaders in Jewry. The "Creed" which Maimonides composed entered the liturgy and is recited daily. The third article reads: "I believe with perfect faith that the Creator, blessed be his name, is not a body and that he is free from all accidents of matter, and that he has not any form whatsoever." The meaning of this highly philosophical formula becomes clearer when read in conjunction with his other works. Here we confine ourselves solely to his *Guide for the Perplexed.*

In this book Maimonides concerns himself with a number of difficulties which arise when the Old Testament and philosophy are confronted. He spends much time explaining biblical anthropomorphism and deals with the question of God's attributes. He stresses that these attributes must not be understood as "qualities" but as acts because the conceptualization of God demands such an attitude. For him God exists without the attribute of

8. Quoted by Eusebius, *Praeparatio evangelica*, VIII, 10.
9. Philo, *De praemiis et poenis*, II, 414.

existence and he is One without the attribute of Unity.[10] Maimonides explains that all which is said of God in the Bible is said parabolically. He even goes so far as to contradict the notion that God "speaks"; what it really means is that God is the cause and creator of all that is said. When we read in the Scriptures that God spake to the prophets we are meant to understand that these men attained to divine knowledge.[11]

Building on the premises of Aristotelian philosophy, Maimonides established the concept of the incorporeality of God and from thence he proceeded to prove God's Unity on the supposition that incorporeal things cannot be counted. By a similar token he shows God's eternity, because motion cannot be predicated of him, which means that he is outside the limitations of time.[12]

The difference between the Maimonidean God and that of the Bible is only too obvious. Maimonides' God is a philosophical postulate neatly adjusted to all the requirements of logic, but he is not alive; He is a concept. No wonder that the philosopher met with such fierce opposition on the part of the rabbis.[13] Only by slow degrees and after years of opposition did he win a place in Jewish thinking.

The Synagogue's doctrine of God is largely influenced by opposition to the Trinitarian view of the Church. In her efforts to contradict Trinitarianism she was driven to an almost numerical concept of the Unity. Thus Bahya ibn Pakuda (second half of the eleventh century) uses the numerical idea in order to show on Euclidean evidence that Unity precedes the number One.[14] For God to be God, he says, He must be an absolute, that is, a non-composite Being. The Midrash already speaks with a view to the Church when it affirms that God can have neither brother nor son.[15] Yehuda Halevi (*ca.* 1085-1142) points out the unreasonableness of the Trinitarian doctrine in his apologetic work: *Alchazari*,[16] and Hasdai Crescas (*ca.* 1340-1412) shows how it contradicts the postulate that God is a necessary existence.[17]

II. Christian Apologetics

To the Synagogue's questioning regarding the doctrine of the Trinity, the Church answered with *catenae* of proofs from the Old Testament. To establish their case Christian apologists were forced upon the slippery path of exegetical acrobatics. Some of this very dubious exegesis is still reproduced in pious tracts for the purpose of converting Jews.[18] But worse than

10. Moses Maimonides, *The Guide for the Perplexed*, Engl. tr. by M. Friedlander, I, 54 (p. 75 f).
11. *Ibid.*, I, 65 (p. 97 f).
12. *Ibid.*, II, I (p. 145 f).
13. Cf. M. Simon, *Jewish Religious Conflicts* (1950), Ch. V, Maimunists and anti-Maimunists.
14. Cf. *Jewish Encyclopedia* (1906), VI, 11a.
15. Deutr. R. c.2.
16. Usually referred to as *Kusari*; cf. *ibid.*, I, 5.
17. *Bittul ikre ha-nozrim*, p. 23.
18. Cf. J. Jocz, "Das exegetische Problem und die Judenmission," *Judaica*, I (1956).

questionable exegesis is the philosophical attempt upon the Holy Trinity. It is our conviction that an effort to establish the doctrine of the Trinity on philosophical grounds is to contradict it. It is not and was never meant to be a logical deduction.

Christian writers have occasionally abandoned the method of logical deduction and adopted the argument of religious usefulness. They point out that the Logos concept is a necessary intermediary to bridge the gulf between God and man. Jesus Christ acts in the capacity of mediator between the invisible God and the created world. All this is based on the assumption that the Johannine Logos is essentially the same as that of Philo. But it seems to us that the resemblance is only in name. It is enough to place the Philonian Logos emanating from God, side by side with the opening words of the Johannine Prologue to see the difference: *en arche en ho logos . . . kai theos en ho logos*. Here the Church acted with unerring instinct when it formulated its credal statement regarding the Trinity as co-eternal and co-equal, "none is greater, or less than the other." This is a flat contradiction of what Philo means by the Logos. The Johannine Logos is no "middle-link" between God and man, but completely God and completely man. This is the meaning of the statement: *Verbum caro factum est.*

We thus want to reiterate: the doctrine of the Trinity cannot be proved from the Old Testament, or from philosophy, or from logic; it is essentially a theological concept. By this we mean to say that the doctrine of the Trinity is the Church's peculiar answer to the question: Who is Jesus Christ?

III. The Christian Position

We hold to the view that there is an important connection between the concept of the Invisible God and the doctrine of the Incarnation. It is our conviction that in the New Testament, exactly as in the Old Testament, God is the Invisible One not because He can be only mentally conceived, but because He is the Holy One of Israel. In other words, here, as throughout the Bible, God's invisibility is not philosophically founded but religiously. He is *aoratos* because of his tender mercy towards man; man cannot survive his visibility, for the God of Israel is a consuming fire (Hebr. 12: 29; Deutr. 4:24). It is interesting to note that the expression *aoratos* belongs exclusively to the New Testament. Though God is here referred to in several passages as the Invisible One, we look upon Col. 1:15 as the *locus classicus* because of its christological importance. There is an obvious association of ideas between Col. 1:15—Christ "the Image of the Invisible God"—and John 1:14—"The Word became flesh and dwelt among us." In the first case, God's invisibility is founded upon His holiness; in the second, God's visibility in Christ is founded upon His love (cf. John 3: 16)—and both are supplementary. He remains the Hidden God not to

consume us, and He becomes God incarnate to save us, from the same motive, for He is a God of Love.

The crux of Christian theology is how to co-ordinate logically the contradiction implied in the Incarnation: the Holy Invisible God becomes visible within the limitation of a human life. The Fathers have wrestled with this problem from their own particular point of view. With the Greek philosophical tradition behind them they felt uncomfortable at the thought that their faith carried a hidden illogicality. The history of dogma is largely the search for a formula which would reconcile the paradox lying at the heart of the Christian faith. The hypostatic Union, *communicatio idiomatum*, the simile of Soul and Body, and many other devices were employed in the attempt to solve the difficulty.[19]

Every age tries to give its own answer to the perennial problem of Christian theology. In our times of humanitarian liberalism when the distance between God and man is reduced to a minimum, the miracle of the Incarnation is neutralized by the Promethean apotheosis of Man: Jesus Christ is only more fully what we already are, *viz.* sons of God and bearers of the divine spark. If we understood W. Norman Pittenger's article correctly, this is what he intends to say. Here are his own words: "He (i.e. Jesus Christ) *is the* Emergence of the eternal Word in full human expression, by perfect union with the creature; of which Emergence the lesser emergences of that Word in and through other men, each in their own small degree, are the adumbration and intimation. . . ."[20]

Whatever else the above quotation and the rest of the article may mean, one thing is unmistakable: this is not Incarnation in the New Testament sense. For the Fourth Gospel, as for Saul of Tarsus, the Incarnation was an incomparable, unique, and non-repeatable Event. It had no parallel in history and was outside human anticipation. It was not founded upon logic or necessity but solely upon the free love of God. There can be no analogy for the Incarnation if we mean what the New Testament means: the Word become flesh. There is only one valid explanation: the measureless love of God. This overwhelming, outrageous love made the Holy One of Israel stoop down and meet the sinner at the point of his deepest need. This is the Gospel: that God becomes Visible as the Saviour of sinners. Apart from the Incarnation He remains the Invisible and Holy God.

IV. The Necessity for Theological Precision

The paradox which is implied in the Gospel message is an offence to the Jew and the Greek. This is something we must acknowledge and not gloss over. The offence of the Cross is that it is the man Jesus who died for the sins of the world and that *this* man is the Son of God. But to acknowledge

19. Cf. G. D. W. Ommanney, *A Critical Dissertation on the Athanasian Creed*, (1897) 352 ff.

20. W. N. Pittenger, "Degree or Kind?" *Canadian Journal of Theology*, October, 1956.

the paradox does not exonerate us from confusing our terms. We frequently use language which is not only offensive to the Jew but which is theologically unjustified. One sometimes hears theologians speak of Jesus as the Incarnate God. The Church Fathers frequently offended in this respect. The author is not too sure whether the term *theotokos* was a felicitous choice though he sympathizes with the issues involved at the Ecumenical Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon. Though Barth defends the term it is not one which is even remotely related to biblical terminology, and where it led to, can be seen from Barth's own evidence.[21] The Poles have no other word for Christmas, except *Boze Narodzenie*—the Birthday of God. There is little difference between *theotokos* and the Polish word for Christmas; neither expresses the miracle of the Incarnation. In the Johannine sense God became man; man did not become God. The New Testament never speaks of the birth of God; such an expression would have been impossible against a Hebrew background. The Fourth Gospel is very cautious; it says that the Word became flesh and leaves it at that. The birth of a god is a pagan possibility. We may legitimately speak of the Second Person of the Trinity, but then we already mean the risen and ascended Christ. That Jesus was God in disguise is something which the ancient Church vigorously opposed. But much of our devotional literature and specially our hymns give that impression. Such a suggestion is foreign to the Bible. It would be wiser to curb exuberance of language and to keep strictly to New Testament terminology which operates within the Hebrew tradition. Israel Abrahams was well justified in his assumption when he said: "It is a plausible suggestion that John had the Shekinah in mind when he spoke (1:14) of the Word or glory as tabernacled (eskenosen) in man."[22] Language more closely related to the New Testament will greatly help us to grasp the meaning and wonder of the message that the Word became flesh. It may even happen, as it happened to the writer of the Fourth Gospel, that as we ponder on the miracle of God's love in Christ and try to put it into words, we will behold his glory, the glory of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth (John 1:14). This is exactly what S. Paul meant when he spoke of "the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." This is the theme of the Incarnation that the glory of the Invisible God becomes endurable for sinners in the face of Jesus Christ. Christology is ultimately not a matter for discussion but an encounter with the Invisible God in the historic person of Jesus the Messiah.

21. Cf. Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, Engl. tr. I/2, 138 ff.
22. I. Abrahams, *The Glory of God* (1925), p. 52.

The Blessed Virgin in Classical Anglicanism

JAMES A. SHUEL

THE attention given to "Mariology" by the Anglican divines of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries has received very little consideration in studies of classical Anglicanism and its major problems. Yet the determination to preserve a proper Mariology was a prominent feature of the classical period, and involved the theologians of the day in a quite typical dilemma. On the one hand, they were only too conscious of the unbalanced cultus of our Lady in popular Roman devotion, as well as of the highly questionable Mariology connected with that cult. On the other hand, they were faced with a growing Puritan body which considered anything "Marian"—even the saying of the *Magnificat*—to be "popish superstition." Here, as on other issues, the exponents of classical Anglicanism were consciously following the middle way between the Roman and Puritan extremes. We should not, however, confuse this attitude with mere compromise, or suppose that these theologians arrived at their position by the judicious use of some quasi-mathematical method. Rather, in the perspective of their fundamental doctrinal principles, they saw in the Mariology of their middle way an integral part of the Church's faith, attested to by the Scriptures, expounded by the Fathers, defined by General Councils, and received in the Anglican Church, and their concern to maintain and defend a proper theological and devotional attitude towards the Blessed Virgin Mary within that Church was one with their concern to preserve the integrity of the Catholic Faith as a whole.

This concern, and the problem it involved for the classical divines, is well illustrated in the work of a seventeenth-century Anglican layman, Anthony Stafford. Stafford produced a devotional book entitled *The Female Glory* (1635) which was devoted entirely to Mary, and which was documented fully with statements from the Fathers. This book, though bearing the official *Imprimatur* of the Church of England, was severely criticized by the Puritans, in particular, one Henry Burton. In an apology for his book Stafford describes the Anglican dilemma and the difficulties of the middle way:

> Had I debased Mary all I could, these sworn enemies of all her infinite graces, had extolled me to the skies; or had I superstitiously idolatrized her, the papists had both magnified and advanced me; whereas keeping the middle, I am cried down by both extremes. But I loathe all preferment that must be acquired by swimming against the stream of that Church from whom I received the first principle of my religion which till death, I will preserve entire.[1]

The seriousness with which the Puritan attacks on Mariology were regarded at this time is indicated by the fact that Burton was summoned before the

1. Stafford, *The Female Glory* (Ed. Orby Shipley, 1869), p. cvii.

Star Chamber to answer for his attacks, and finally along with two colleagues, was severely punished.

The aspect of Mariology with which the classical Anglican divines were primarily concerned was that of Mary's real instrumentality in the scheme of redemption. This aspect is central in the New Testament picture of Mary, especially in the Lucan narrative which devotes considerable attenition to her unique role as a human moral and physical agent co-operating with God in the Mystery of the Incarnation. The Church, in the second and third centuries, went on to express this instrumentality or agency of Mary by the analogy of the "second Eve" and the title "Mother of God," the latter eventually receiving conciliar authority.

I. The Mother of God

The title "Mother of God" was continuously used in Anglicanism in the classical period, and the evidence would indicate that the title was a familiar one to Anglicans on all levels.

The acceptance of the term "Mother of God" in the Church of England was seized upon by the Roman controversialists in the sixteenth century as evidence of her inconsistency in emphasizing the principle of scriptural authority. The bishops of the Church of England in 1537 had declared that they had compiled *The Institution of A Christian Man* after a careful search of the Holy Scriptures to determine all things necessary for the Christian man to believe, and in this work they said that the Blessed Virgin is called the Mother of God in virtue of her unique part in the redemption as described in the New Testament.[2]

Rather later both Bishop Jewel and William Whitaker, a close friend of Archbishop Whitgift, justified the use of the term in the Anglican Church, against Roman polemic. Jewel referred to the term as part of the "catholic truth of our religion" and justified its use on the ground that it was implicit in Scripture and authorized by the Fathers.[3] Whitaker similarly maintained that the term expounds "the genuine sense of Scripture"[4] and declared that it is a "notable calumny" to suggest "that the title of *theotokos* or *Deipara* is not grounded upon the Scripture, for the Fathers proved the Virgin to be *theotokos* from the Scriptures, against Nestorius."[5]

In the next century the title "Mother of God" is found constantly in the forefront of Anglican apologetic. Anthony Stafford loses all patience with his Puritan opponents over having to defend Mary's right to the title, and says,

> The union of both Natures, God and Man, being in Christ, she must, by strong consequences, bring forth God and Man. But Burton, and his silly fraternity, have not brains of a temper fine enough to distinguish between the

2. *Formularies of Faith in the Reign of Henry VIII* (Oxford, 1856), p. 206.
3. *Works* (PS), III, p. 225. (Note. PS = Parker Society. LACT = Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology.)
4. Whitaker, *A Disputation on Holy Scripture* (PS), p. 603.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 538 f.

Mother of God and the Mother of the Godhead, the first of which she truly is; the latter she is not.[6]

Bishop Bramhall, living as an exile on the continent during the Commonwealth because he held to the Catholic Faith, similarly takes a very firm stand with his opponent—in this case a representative of the Roman Communion, by whom the catholicity of the Anglican Communion has been impugned. Bramhall answers: "We receive not your upstart supposititious traditions, nor unwritten fundamentals; but we admit genuine, universal, Apostolic traditions; as the Apostles' Creed, the perpetual Virginity of the Mother of God . . . "[7]

At the end of the seventeenth century George Bull defends the position given to the Blessed Virgin in Anglicanism, against the Puritan dissenters, in a sermon entitled "The Blessed Virgin's Low and Exalted Condition." In a passage in this sermon Bishop Bull gives an apology for the title "Mother of God:"

> The Fathers of the Third General Council at Ephesus, convened against Nestorius, approved the title of *theotokos*, the Mother of God, given to the Blessed Virgin.
>
> They approved it, I say. They did not first invent it, as some have ignorantly affirmed. And therefore they themselves in their synodical Epistle say, that the holy Fathers before them, doubted not to call the Blessed Virgin *theotokon Deiparam*, the Mother of God . . . We have heard Irenaeus, who was a scholar to a scholar of the Apostles, magnifying the Virgin upon this account, that she did *portare Deum*, bear God within her. If she did *portare Deum*, she did *parere Deum*, if she bore God, she brought him forth too, and so was the Mother of God, that is: of him that was God. Nay the blessed Martyr and disciple of one of the Apostles, Ignatius, in his Epistle to the Ephesians, feared not to say, Our God Jesus was conceived of Mary. But what need we search after human authorities, when the inspired Elizabeth plainly gives the Blessed Virgin the same title? "And whence is this to me, that the Mother of my Lord should come unto me?" Where "the Mother of our Lord" is doubtless of the same import with the Mother of God: For the title of "our Lord" belongs to Christ chiefly, as He is "our God."[8]

In the area of theological exposition, it is John Pearson in the mid-seventeenth century who gives the most complete explanation of the term. Bishop Pearson, whose *Exposition of the Creed* (1659) became a standard theological text-book, in his discussion of the Incarnation skilfully elucidates the real dependence of Christ in His human nature on His Mother who gave Him mortal flesh, as the ultimate reason for her description by the Councils as Mother of God. Pearson describes how we must attribute a true conception, nutrition, and parturition to the Blessed Virgin in the Nativity:

> Wherefore from these three . . . we must acknowledge that the Blessed Virgin was truly and properly the mother of our Saviour. And so is she frequently

6. *Op. cit.*, p. lxxxix.
7. *Works* (LACT), I, p. 53.
8. Bull, *Some Important Points of Primitive Christianity Maintained and Defended* (London, 1714), II, pp. 154–156.

styled the mother of Jesus in the language of the Evangelists, and so by Elizabeth particularly the "Mother of her Lord," as also by the general assent of the Church (because He which was born of her was God), the *Deipara*; . . . and so the Virgin was plainly named the Mother of God.[9]

Bishop Pearson gives an extensive footnote tracing the history of the term *Theotokos*, and points out that the title can only be denied at the risk of incurring the charge of heresy.[10]

Isaac Barrow, about ten years later, follows Pearson in stressing the three particulars which are involved in "the concurrence of the Blessed Virgin Mary to our Lord's generation," and which safeguard the reality of the part played by human agency in the actual bringing about of the Incarnation. Barrow goes on to say:

Whatever, therefore, any mother does confer to the entire production of a child, is to be attributed to the Blessed Virgin; whence also she was truly and properly the mother of our Lord, and is accordingly often so called in the Gospel; whence also she has been in the Church defined to be and commonly styled *theotokos*, the bearer and mother of God, that is, of Him who is God; that term asserting the Divinity of Christ and the unity of His person against Nestorius and his partisans.[11]

Although the title "Mother of God" disappeared from the common worship in the 1552 Prayer Book, nevertheless it continued to be used in private prayers, and appears frequently in sermons and devotional literature of the seventeenth century. Bishop Andrewes used the prayer from the Eastern Liturgy in his *Preces Privatae*: "commemorating the all holy, immaculate, more than blessed Mother of God and ever Virgin Mary with all saints . . . "[12] and Bishop Jeremy Taylor in his *Great Exemplar* prays to be given the virtues created in the "ever-blessed Virgin, the Mother of God."[13]

John Donne gives us an indication of how familiar the description of Mary as Mother of God was to an early seventeenth-century congregation in England, when in a Christmas sermon in 1624 he says quite naturally: "The Blessed Mother of God in our text was a Virgin."[14] Dr. Mark Frank (1612-1664), who was chaplain to the Archbishop of Canterbury, used the title freely in his sermons, which were collected and published after his death under the *Imprimatur* of his successor. Bishop Ken refers to the Mother of God in his hymn for the Sunday after Epiphany; and his contemporary George Hickes in his *Discourse of the Due Praise and Honour of the Virgin Mary*, bearing the official *Imprimatur* (1684), says that the English Church honours Mary as did the Primitive Church, by calling her "without scruple the Holy, and Blessed Mother of God."[15]

9. Pearson, *Exposition of the Creed* (Oxford, 1890, ed. E. Burton), Art. III, p.317–320.
10. *Op. cit.*, Art. III, n. 36.
11. *Theological Works* (Cambridge, 1859), VI, p. 250.
12. Intercession for Thursday Morning.
13. *Works* (London, 1822, ed. R. Heber), II, p. 9.
14. *Works* (London, 1839), p. 35.
15. *Sermons* (London, 1713), II, p. 131.

The degree to which the laity must have been familiar with the term "Mother of God" is pointed up by the devotional books published for the laity in this period. Anthony Stafford uses the term frequently throughout his book, the full title of which is *The Female Glory; or The Life and Death of our Blessed Lady, the Holy Virgin Mary, God's own Immaculate Mother*. But much more influential amongst the laity, was Robert Nelson's *Companion for the Festivals and Fasts of the Church of England*, first published in 1703 and frequently reprinted during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In his section on the Feast of the Annunciation, Nelson asks and answers:

Q: Why is the Blessed Virgin Mary styled the Mother of God?

A: Because the second person in the Blessed Trinity, the Son of God, by virtue of an eternal generation, vouchsafed to descend from heaven, and to stoop so low as to enter into the womb of the Virgin; where, being united to our nature, which was formed and conceived there, He submitted to a second generation according to the flesh. So that this Son of God was truly the Son of the Virgin, and consequently she that brought forth the man was really the mother of God; and by her cousin Elizabeth she is styled the mother of her Lord, which word Lord was counted equivalent to the word God.[16]

II. The Second Eve

The analogy of the second Eve was introduced very early in the Church as the natural complement of St. Paul's analogy of the second Adam, relating the story of man's fall to the drama of man's redemption. The analogy is a most useful one, for it helps us to keep in mind that Mary was an agent of God in the Incarnation in a moral as well as physical way. True human instrumentality required a real moral decision on Mary's part. The God who created man as a purposeful creature with a free will would not do violence to man's nature by ignoring the full scope of his instrumentality and over-ruling his will.

Hence the doctrine of the second Eve says that Mary was a real, effective, creaturely agent in the process of God's re-creation of the world, a process which was initiated when Mary reversed Eve's unfaithfulness and declared, "Be it unto me according to thy word," and the "power of the Highest" overshadowed her. Yet the analogy at this point must break down, for while Eve possessed the power to initiate man's fall, it was only Christ who possessed the power to initiate and effect man's salvation; the choice, preparation and conception of Mary were effected by the God whom she willingly bore.

The truth contained in the analogy was well expressed by the Anglican bishops in *The Institution of A Christian Man* (1537), in their exposition of the *Ave Maria*:

What excellent honour was she put to when, notwithstanding the decree was made of his nativity by the whole Trinity, yet the thing was not done and

16. Nelson, *A Companion to the Festivals and Fasts of the Church of England* (London, 1846), p. 154.

accomplished without or before her consent was granted. . . . And how high grace was this, that after the default made through the persuasion of the first woman, our mother Eve, (by whom Adam was brought into disobedience), this blessed virgin was elect to be the instrument of our reparation, in that she was chosen to bear the Saviour and Redeemer of the world! And is not this a wonderful prerogative, to see a virgin to be a mother, and against the general sentence of the malediction of Eve, to conceive and bring forth her child without sin? And well he may be called the blessed fruit, which hath saved us and given us life, contrary to the cursed fruit, which Eve gave to Adam, by which we were destroyed and brought to death; but blessed is the fruit of this womb which is the fruit of life everlasting.[17]

Roger Hutchinson (?-1555) made use of the analogy between Eve and the Virgin, in defending the reality of the Incarnation against a woman who was probably an anabaptist, and who apparently professed a docetic Christ. Hutchinson, along with Latimer, Cranmer and Ridley, was involved in the case against the woman. The woman, Joan Bocher, was burned for heresy on May 2, 1550 and Hutchinson, who published his book, *Image of God* or *Layman's Book*, later the same year, wrote the following passage with specific reference to Bocher's case:

God sent His Son, "born, or made, of a woman." But why Christ born of a woman? Truly, because sin and death overflowed the world through the first woman, He worketh the mystery of life and righteousness by another woman; that the blame of sin should not be imputed to His creature which is good, but to the will by which Eve sinned.[18]

Hutchinson goes on to refute the old heresy professed by Joan, that Christ passed through Mary "as water gusheth through a pipe or conduit" (Anglicans of the following century were continually being called upon to refute this heresy), and says that the "second Adam" took of the substance and nature" of Mary for

it was needful that the same flesh should be punished on the tree, which offended in eating of the fruit of the tree . . . Besides St. Paul says, "We are members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones." But how are we "flesh of Christ's flesh," except he be flesh of Mary's flesh, and bones of Mary's bones?[19]

The seventeenth-century Anglican writers make frequent references to the analogy of the second Eve. John Donne alludes to Mary as the inverse of Eve in the poem *The Virgin Mary* (1608-1609):

> For that fair blessed Mother-maid,
> Whose flesh redeemed us; that she-cherubim,
> Which unlocked Paradise, and made
> One claim for innocence, and disseized sin.

Bishop Forbes, in commenting on the passage from St. Irenaeus where he writes of the Virgin Mary as the "advocate of the Virgin Eve" speaks of the Blessed Virgin as "an instrument of the saving incarnation."[20]

17. *Op. cit.*, pp. 206–208.
18. *Works* (PS), p. 144.
19. *Loc. cit.*
20. Irenaeus, *Adv. Haer.* III, 22:4; Forbes, *Considerationes Modestae* (LACT), I, p. 351.

Bishop Hall introduces the analogy between Eve and the Virgin Mary to show how the Redemption was the inverse of the Fall, in his meditation on the Annunciation: "It was fit our reparation should answer our fall. An evil angel was the first motioner of the one to Eve, a virgin then espoused to Adam, in the garden of Eden; a good angel is the first reporter of the other to Mary, a virgin espoused to Joseph."[21]

Anthony Stafford draws on the doctrine of the second Eve, and says that Mary "might better be called the Mother of the Living, than Eve, since she, like a murderess, gave her children death ere birth"[22] and when the angel Gabriel appears to Mary, Stafford has him say to her: "Consent to thy own happiness, and the Redemption of all humanity."[23] Stafford brings out Mary's essential agency in the Redemption elsewhere in two panegyrics upon the Virgin:

> Methinks I hear her plaints. "O Christ that I
> Should give Thee Flesh; for else Thou could'st not die!
> Divinity is from all passion free,
> That Thou canst suffer torments was from me" . . . [24]

and

> He who made the world, and nature did ordain,
> Was made of Thy flesh; . . .
> That of the greatest blessing God e'er sent
> To sinful man, thou wert the instrument.[25]

Bishop Taylor, though he does not use the second Eve analogy directly, says that God "chose her from all the daughters of Adam, to be instrumental of the restitution of grace and innocence to all her father's family."[26]

Bishop Hickes says of the obedience of the second Eve:

> The Blessed Virgin . . . was strong in faith. . . . She knew that He who formed Adam, of the ground and Eve of one of the ribs of Adam, was also able to form the Body of His Son of her substance; and therefore though she knew not a man, she said unto the angel, "Behold, the Handmaid of the Lord, be it unto me according to thy word."[27]

Bishop Ken, in a hymn for the First Sunday after Epiphany contrasts Eve and the Virgin Mary in their respective roles:

> As Eve when she her fontal sin reviewed,
> Wept for herself, and all she should include;
> Blessed Mary, with man's Saviour in embrace,
> Joyed for herself, and for all human race.[28]

And finally near the end of the century we have a reference in Bishop Bull's sermon on the Blessed Virgin:

> The Blessed Virgin Mary was the only woman, that took off the stain and dishonour of her sex, by being the instrument of bringing that into the world, which should repair and make amends for the loss and damage brought to mankind by the transgression of the first woman Eve. By a woman, as the

21. *Works* (Oxford, 1858, ed. P. Wynter), II, p. 301.
22. *Op. cit.*, p. 15.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 32 f.
24. *Ibid.*, p. cxlvii.
25. *Ibid.*, p. cxxxvi f.
26. *Op. cit.*, II, p. 12.
27. *Op. cit.*, II, p. 70.
28. Ken, *Christian Year* (London, 1868), p. 62.

principal cause, we were undone; and by a woman as a instrument under God, a Saviour and Redeemer is born to us. And the Blessed Virgin is that woman.[29]

Bishop Bull goes on to discuss St. Irenaeus' passage on the subject, in regard to the Virgin Mary as the "advocate of the Virgin Eve." Bull translates *advocata* as "comforter" and says:

How did Eve receive comfort from the Blessed Virgin Mary? I answer, in that gracious promise delivered by God Himself in the sentence passed on the Serpent, after Eve's seduction by him, Gen. 3:15, where it is said "that the Seed of the woman should bruise the Serpent's head." Every man knows now that the Seed there spoken of, is Christ: and consequently, that the individual woman, whose immediate seed He was to be is the Blessed Virgin Mary. The Holy Virgin was the happy instrument of the saving incarnation of the Son of God, who has effectually crushed the old Serpent the Devil, and destroyed his power over all those that believe on Himself; and thereby she became the instrument of comfort to Eve, and all other sinners.[30]

It is evident that from the first existence of Anglicanism independent of Rome at the beginning of Archbishop Cranmer's primacy, right up to the eighteenth century, the Anglican Church maintained without interruption the essential Mariology that was developed by the Fathers and defined by the General Councils. Throughout this period it was recognized that God's real involvement in human history and human nature depended on the real human instrumentality of Mary, and in consequence, the conciliar acknowledgment of Mary as Mother of God occupied a central place in expositions and sermons on the Incarnation, as did to a lesser extent the analogy of the second Eve.

It is significant that this Mariology was held with such firmness, and was accompanied by a real devotion to Mary, during the very difficult classical period when Anglican divines were most critical of the unbalanced Marian practices of the Roman Communion. But what they saw exemplified in an unique way in Mary, was God's proper and effectual use of human instruments in His work of Redemption, and it is this principle which is implicit in the doctrine of the Church, the Sacraments, and the Ministry. At a time when the whole Catholic structure of the historic Church was being challenged by the growing force of radical Puritanism, the classical Anglican divines could not afford to neglect the position given in Christian tradition to the Blessed Virgin, the Mother of God.

29. *Op. cit.*, II, pp. 151–3. 30. *Loc. cit.*

A Meditation on Jonah

ROBERT DOBBIE

I

IN the year 1792, a young Baptist minister in Kettering, England, published a slender volume entitled *An Enquiry into the Obligations of Christians to Use Means for the Conversion of the Heathen.* It represented a deliberate onslaught upon the official policy of British churches in his day, inasmuch as they generally assumed that missionary enterprise was no necessary expression of the Gospel.

The Book of Jonah is such an *Enquiry*, composed in a similar crisis in the religious history of Israel. It appeared, it would seem, at a time when the considered aim of the Jewish Church was to separate the pious worshipper from contact with all contaminating agencies. Nehemiah and Ezra in turn had envisaged the creation of a new nation-church, whose purity would be fashioned and maintained by immunity from non-Jewish fellowship, and rejection of evangelical responsibility. Against this self-satisfied and unimaginative view that God had no concern with remote or alien people, the writer of Jonah depicts Him as deeply concerned for the inhabitants of distant and wicked Nineveh. To the arrogant insistence that only Israel is called of God he replies that Jonah is called to be a missionary to the barbarous East. His graphic plea is a worthy predecessor of William Carey's classic *Enquiry.*

II

Jonah, it is narrated, rebels against his prophetic and evangelical mission. For unstated reasons he seeks to evade his commission. Carey, with grim realism, depicts the common demurrers of his generation to any missionary proposal. Men are deterred, even when they have begun to acknowledge the validity of the missionary claim, by the distances to be travelled, by the need to live among uncouth peoples, by the dangers attendant upon life in a primitive society, by the prospect of unpalatable food, and by the supreme difficulty of language. Carey ruthlessly demolishes each successive argument, and insists that Christ's command to proclaim the Gospel in every land carries inescapable responsibility with it. So imperative an order Jonah receives from his God, but he sees fit to reject it.

Jonah's flight from this ultimate responsibility may be natural to men. It corresponds to Isaiah's portraiture of them as rebelling against God their Father. It is echoed in Francis Thompson's reluctance to capitulate to the absolute claim of that "tremendous lover" who pursued him with imperious plea, and in his attempted escape from "those swift feet that followed, followed after." It is symbolized in Augustine's judgment on his own vain

endeavour to enjoy life without God; "Woe to my soul with its rash hope of finding something better if it forsook Thee."

Jonah, however, discovers, as Francis Thompson discovered, that "all things betray thee who betrayest Me." Events conspire against God's chosen servant who refuses to acknowledge his Master's right to command. This is the obverse of the spiritual rule that they who seek God's kingdom first have all other things added to them, for rejection of God's approach brings in its train the relentless antagonism of events, the total dislocation of one's life. It is a fearful thing, truly commented the writer to the Hebrews, to fall into the hands of a living God. Amos was right when he portrayed those in wrong relation to God as unable to find rest or peace even in the depths of the sea.

In this remorseless sequence of decision and nemesis, Jonah finds his flight to Tarshish prejudiced by a storm. The calamity provokes the natural, if unconsciously cynical, response of man to disaster, that he turn to God for deliverance. "All lost! To prayers, to prayers! All lost!" cry the sailors in *The Tempest*. So the mariners in Jonah's vessel call upon their God. The *deus ex machina* is not less a spontaneous hope of the human heart, than a dramatic device of the Greek tragedians.

The sailors interpret their calamity as the consequence of sin. The moral realm impinges on the natural, and its effects impair the helpful functioning of nature. In addition, it is assumed that by the sin of one, discord and ruin become the lot of many. From this impasse, escape is possible only by the forcible ejection of the offender. By the sin of one, death enters into life: by the death of one, life will return to all.

This picture of the intricate inter-relationship between men needs no endorsement. The ravages of an Attila or a Genghis Khan, the creative impact of a Francis of Assisi, a John Wesley, or a Gandhi, illustrate laterally and lineally the communication of evil and of good. The agonizing sense of political responsibility in the racial tensions of the Deep South of the United States, or the consciousness of collective guilt in modern Germany, demonstrate the moral nemesis of sin. Whether nature itself, in its more impersonal modes as distinct from its human aspect in the body of man, can function within the ambit of a moral, disciplinary governance of life, may be difficult to determine, but if nature is totally severed from God, the universe, as H. H. Farmer has argued, becomes dichotomized. Some sustained contact must therefore be postulated or envisaged between God and the realm of nature.

It must however be remembered that not all human contingency can be directly ascribed to divine agency. Life contains a strange, baffling infusion of mystery, which, deriving from this very freedom of nature, seems to deny God's presence in His world, bequeathing to the mind an enigma not easily solved, and to the heart a burden not lightly borne. A young missionary of twenty-seven, who has trained himself sedulously, in language, theology, and life, to serve in Madagascar, becomes afflicted with a tropical disease

en route for his post, and reaches his destination only to be buried. A medical missionary dies in India at thirty-six from lack of salt in her body, after seven years of unremitting toil, for the sake of which she had renounced a useful and not unprofitable business career. Yet, notwithstanding these instances, and the principle of natural liberty which they embody, and the theological query they raise about the actuality of divine government, it is necessary to affirm, because it is impossible to escape, the strict nemesis which attends betrayal, disloyalty, and rebelliousness before God's behests. No matter how bewildering or how poignant may be the tragic sense of life, faith in a God who educates us for His purposes cannot exclude His varied approach to our lives, by nature, as by man, and by His own direct constraint.

III

The writer of Jonah knows that God will not renounce His claim to His chosen servants. Not only is Jonah pursued when he plots escape: he is swallowed by the "whale" in order that he may be returned to *terra firma*, and receive a second call which he may have the wisdom to accept. The crucial truth in this episode is not the accommodation of nature to divine commands, but the unfailing and magisterial character of God's purposes in His Kingdom. Thus it is not enough to bear in mind, as R. F. Horton suggests, that we do not ask whether these images are true, any more than we may ask whether the images in the *Pilgrim's Progress* are true. Nor is it legitimate to quote Frank Bullen in the enthralling story in his *Idylls of the Sea*, concerning a whaling hand who, washed overboard in a storm, and swallowed by a whale, emerged alive and comparatively unscathed from the monster when it was captured within twenty-four hours. Rather it is imperative that we mark the insistent intention of God, to compel Jonah to acknowledge and accept his missionary vocation, as He compels Jeremiah to capitulate to the constraint of a divine word, Livingstone to respond to the smoke of a thousand African kraals, Thomas Bridges to seek out the most degraded people on the face of earth, and to find them, on Darwin's testimony after his voyage in H.M.S. *Beagle*, in Tierra del Fuego.

Jonah shoulders his missionary task when God confronts him with it again. The gospel of a second chance is not unknown in the annals of devout Christians. Revival swept Britain some forty years ago, under the inspiration of a Baptist minister who at first refused to answer the call to a nation-wide evangelistic mission. Douglas Brown was fast losing health, spiritual power, and peace of mind before he finally decided that not even his fruitful ministry in Balham, London, must take precedence of this haunting summons. Not dissimilarly, Stanley Jones at first viewed with alarm and misgiving his commission to commend the Gospel to high-caste Hindus, yielding at last only to a strong inward assurance that, in resources of body, mind, and soul, he would be made equal to his task.

The task of Jonah, the story tells, was sufficiently testing to try both

courage and conviction. He was summoned to be a prophet of doom; he must pronounce judgment upon infamous Nineveh. This may well have been regarded as the authentic mark of a prophet in eighth and seventh century Israel, but at any time it taxes "heart and nerve and sinew." It may indeed constitute an integral part of Christian preaching. George Fox, the Quaker leader in England, once felt compelled, by the divine urgency in his soul, to go into the city now associated most with the name of Samuel Johnson, and utter against Lichfield fiery and passionate denunciation. True to his commission, he walked along its streets, proclaiming in stentorian tones the words of doom: "Woe to the bloody city of Lichfield!"

It is questionable how much penitence might be expected from such raucous and unsparing utterance. But the ratio between preaching and repentance does not depend merely upon positive presentation of truth. When John Wesley went as a missionary to the Indians of Georgia, he believed he had a distinctive message to proclaim, but neither it nor his humourless cataloguing of the sins of his audience availed to beget conversion. "I went to Georgia," he later wrote, "to convert the Indians, but who will convert me?"

It is told that the people of Nineveh repented at the preaching of Jonah. They applied to themselves his words of condemnation, acknowledging their title to punishment. They bowed before the truth Amos long enunciated, that God is concerned with conduct, that piety must manifest itself in righteousness, that religion necessitates morality. This recognition, further, would not be rendered invalid if the motive of penitence was to avert calamity. Jesus depicts the prodigal as returning to his father because he wishes to escape the unsavoury consequences of his sin. A moral universe implies theologically significant nemesis. If the wages of sin is death, it is a death that is providentially designed to lead again to life. A generation unwilling to accept, perhaps, this disquieting phenomenon of painful education, may well illustrate the claim of C. S. Lewis that it is all too easy to conceive of God as a Grandfather in Heaven.

IV

Jonah is displeased at the very success of his preaching. The avoidance of calamity by a sequence of penitence and mercy seemed to him a violation of the basic canons of justice. Retribution, he reasons, must surely be an inescapable feature of reality. Thus he becomes angered by the divine compassion, because it seems to repudiate an ultimate category of his faith —that sinners should be punished. But justice is a two-edged sword. Portia's words to Shylock immortalize the precarious and damning nature of its judgments:

> Therefore, Jew,
> Though Justice be thy plea, consider this—
> That in the course of Justice none of us
> Should see salvation.

"Get Justice," said Emil Brunner, in a sermon in the chapel of St. Andrews University in Scotland, as he preached on the parable of the workers hired at successive hours of the day. "Get Justice, get hanged." Justice indeed bodes ill for Everyman; but the transcendence of justice frees and satisfies the soul. Its redemptive and supremely divine character was demonstrated once for all to C. F. Andrews when, in his youth, his parents took into their home, to love and cherish in his utter need, an old family friend who had betrayed a financial trust affecting them—a betrayal which caused no little impoverishment in their lives.

Jonah, perplexed, frustrated, angered, resentful, retires from the city to observe it in detachment. He has lost, if not indeed forfeited, the passion to preach; he has become a needy soul, requiring enlightenment and conversion. God proceeds to teach him, in the manner of the earlier prophets, by using dramatic symbolism. The gourd is not primarily an emblem of divine compassion; it is an instrument of instruction. God employs it to reveal Jonah to himself, to unmask the false, sentimental character of his sympathy, to set in disquieting contrast his concern for a short-lived gourd, and his total disregard for six-score thousand people, to pillory his deep feeling for a dying plant as compared with his indifference to lost humanity.

This, however, is the supreme glory of God. He is gravely anxious for the weal and destiny of all types of men; for the clod-like mass in Nineveh, who may reflect the truth expressed by Tennyson's *Northern Farmer* that "the poor in a lump is bad," not less or more than for the clever scoundrel or the diseased reprobate, for Al Capone or Oscar Wilde. It is His purpose, in Saul Kane's words in Masefield's *Everlasting Mercy*, "To brother all the souls on earth." This quality has been clearly discerned and neatly presented by C. S. Lewis. In *The Screwtape Letters* he depicts Screwtape, the Devil, as directing his nephew, Wormwood, in diabolical strategy against "The Enemy," God, who is ever alert to save the sons of men, but uses no weapons of earth or hell. "Always remember," says Screwtape, with that touch of fiendish insight which compels admiration and assent, "that he really likes the little vermin." From this love not even Nineveh can be excluded; for the fulfilment of its purpose Jonah too must be disciplined till he obeys the heavenly vision.

Barth, the Atonement, and the Preacher

A. LEONARD GRIFFITH

RECENT translation has made available an English edition of Volume IV, Part 1 of Karl Barth's *Church Dogmatics*. In it the Swiss theologian begins his massive treatment of the central dogma of the Christian Faith, the doctrine of the atonement.

In his own introduction Barth asserts that the doctrine of the atonement is at the very heart of the Christian Gospel. That Gospel "has a circumference, the doctrine of creation and the doctrine of the last things, the redemption and consummation. But the covenant fulfilled in the atonement is its centre,"[1] the point from which we can see all else. Barth also explains that by this atonement which is at the heart and centre of the Christian message he means the "free act of the faithfulness of God in which He takes the lost cause of man, who has denied Him as Creator and in so doing ruined himself as creature, and makes it His own in Jesus Christ, carrying it through to its goal and in that way maintaining and manifesting His own glory in the world."[2]

Surveying the atonement, as he has presented it in this and in the remaining two parts of Volume IV,[3] Barth states in effect that the content of that doctrine is the knowledge of Jesus Christ as the reconciling God, as reconciled man, and as the One in whom as reconciling God and reconciled man the whole event of atonement took place. In accordance with these three basic Christological concepts—Christ as very God, very man, and as the God-man—Barth develops his doctrine in three forms, the first of which appears in *Church Dogmatics* IV, 1 under the general Christological title, "Jesus Christ, the Lord as Servant." With his customary "fugue-like elaboration" Barth approaches this first form of the doctrine from three directions: (1) "The Obedience of the Son of God," which reveals (2) "The Pride and Fall of Man," but which makes possible (3) "The Justification of Man." Barth concludes each form of the doctrine by considering its "subjective realization" in the Christian Community and the Christian individual.

Barth defies identification with any of the classic theories of atonement. Reference has more than once been made to "the difficulty of finding a place for him in the theological filing system." He has a doctrine entirely peculiar to himself and founded on the distinctively Christological character of his theology. Indeed Barth equates Theology and Christology. He denies

1. Barth, Karl, *Church Dogmatics*, Volume IV, *The Doctrine of Reconciliation*, Part 1 (Eds. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance; Edinburgh, 1956, T. & T. Clark), p. 3.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
3. On January 5, 1958, Barth himself, in a personal conversation with this writer, insisted that a fair presentation of his doctrine of the atonement should be on the basis of all three parts of Volume IV, of which Part 2 remains as yet untranslated and Part 3 unpublished. According to Barth, however, Part 1, especially the Introduction, furnishes an accurate prospectus and makes clear the general theological character of the argument.

any possibility of a general *a priori* knowledge of God apart from His historic revelation. We must think of God exclusively in terms of Jesus Christ, says Barth. The only true history of God with man is the history of Jesus Christ; indeed this *is* history, the only thing that ever really happened, the one act of God with which Creation, Providence and all else are identified. Man has no independent existence apart from the God who has acted for his redemption in Jesus Christ. It is by way of this entirely original emphasis that Barth develops his doctrine of reconciliation.[4]

If Barth's theory permits any classification at all, it may be called "objective," in fact, more "objective" even than the theories of Anselm and the Reformers. So far as Barth is concerned, atonement is exclusively an act of God, accomplished by God through Jesus Christ in complete independence of man. Man plays no part whatever in his own reconciliation with God; he makes no contribution to it save the very sinful separation from God which necessitates his reconciliation. The initiative, the desire for atonement comes from God, not from man. It happens not only without man, but in spite of him, in defiance of him. It happened at a particular time in history, at a particular place, in the Incarnation, Crucifixion and Resurrection of Jesus Christ, and having happened, it need not and cannot take place again. It is a "finished" work, finished in both a temporal and a qualitative sense. Moreover, it is all-embracing, the reconciliation to God not only of certain men, but of all mankind, indeed of the whole cosmos. Man's situation has been objectively changed, radically and decisively. By no flight of the imagination can man annul that change; he may "realize" it or not "realize" it, but even realization comes not from within himself but from beyond himself, as the work of the Holy Spirit.

In so far as the atonement has taken place in the events associated with the historical Jesus, Barth's theory may be called "substitutionary," but not in any way that contradicts the concept of representation. Indeed Barth dwells insistently upon the representative character of Jesus Christ as the original "Adam," as the "man of justification history," the *Man* in atonement. Barth dissociates himself from the older theories of substitution, especially the sacrificial theories which conceived of Jesus Christ as God's "whipping boy" for the sins of men. Barth's emphasis lies not on the transactional or even vicarious aspect of atonement, but on the fact of man's helplessness and on God's gracious condescension in doing for man what he could not do for himself. Jesus Christ is "for us," the "Judge judged in our place," Sacrifice as well as Priest. All things needful to our reconciliation have taken place in Him, the God-man. He is our effective Substitute.

Barth is thoroughly consistent. He will not allow of a human contribution of works or of faith that creates or that complements the atonement. He does, however, present what he considers to be the true "subjective" side of atonement. He calls it the "subjective realization," man's awareness

4. Barth begins with the Christological question; he would disagree with Paul Tillich who approaches the atonement from the side of man's existential predicament. *Systematic Theology*, Volume II.

"that the verdict pronounced in Jesus Christ applies to himself with everyone else, that the justification of sinful man accomplished in Him is his justification and that of all men."[5] This subjective realization, Barth hastens to make clear, is not by itself a different sphere of reality. It is of the same substance as the objective atoning work of God in Jesus Christ and must be related to it. Because the objective fact of atonement is not the work of proud, sinful, fallen man, neither is the subjective realization his work. "It must be on the basis of a particular address and gift, in virtue of a particular awakening power of God . . . ,"[6] that is, it must be the work of the Holy Spirit, the third Person of the Trinity. The Holy Spirit attests the atonement to man as an objective fact, and this "not as the impartation of an abstract doctrine, but as the attestation of the living Jesus Christ Himself."[7] Indeed He is as such the Spirit of Jesus Christ, "the power in which Jesus Christ attests Himself, attests Himself effectively, creating in man response and obedience."[8]

Coming to grips with Barth's virile doctrine of the atonement, the minister of a Church very naturally asks, Will this doctrine preach? Is it preachable? Can it be translated into the vernacular and communicated to modern man in language and thought-forms that he will understand? Perhaps the question as such has little importance; it answers itself once the more fundamental issue has been faced, viz., is Barth's doctrine true? Does it represent the real situation about God and man and man's sin? If it be true, if it be in accord with the deepest insights of Scripture, then the preacher has no moral right to weigh it academically as he would weigh conflicting theories of worship and Church administration. If Barth describes the situation that *is*, then the preacher has no alternative but to preach within the framework of that situation and presuppose it as the content of his message.

It helps us to recall that Barth himself started as a preacher, the pastor of a congregation, faced with the pastor's peculiar problem, the sermon. Not "What is the technique?" but "How can one preach at all?" was the question bothering him. He describes it in one of his earlier books. "On Sunday morning when the bells ring to call the congregation and minister to church, there is in the air an *expectancy* that something great, crucial, and even momentous is to happen."[9] "And here above all," he says, "is a *man* upon whom the expectation of the apparently imminent event seems to rest in a special way. . . . "[10] "And then he will enter the pulpit and—here is daring —*preach*."[11] Paraphrasing Barth, Frederick L. Herzog describes the suffering, fate, evil and death in the lives of his people, the human situation to

5. Barth, *op. cit.*, p. 646.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 645.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 647.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 648.
9. *The Word of God and the Word of Man*, translated from *Die Wort Gottes und die Theologie* by Douglas Horton, p. 104.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 105.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 106.

which the preacher must speak from "the strange new world of the Bible." "Everything existing in time is subject to chance, and nature is silent. In the face of it all man raises the question whether it is true that God is present and that He is lovingly concerned with His creatures. What is life? Whence does it come? Whither does it lead? These are questions that people cannot answer for themselves. Death, the last things, time and eternity, are problems for which people seek solutions in Church. Even more, rather than solutions, they seek redemption. They yearn for God as the redeemer of humanity."[12] To this situation the preacher must speak an authentic Word of God.

The task of Christian preaching remains unchanged. An economic depression, a world war, the emergence of international communism, and the advent of the atomic age have not removed but only intensified the searching questions for which men, albeit unconsciously, seek an answer in Church. That the Church has evaded these questions may account for its rapidly-declining influence; on the other hand, it may be that men stay away from Church precisely because the Church does have the very answer which they most fear to face. Barth has come to grips with that answer in his powerful doctrine of the atonement, which is hardly a pleasing word designed to comfort men and women in cushioned pews, but is rather a stern, negative word of judgment and despair. Nevertheless, if Barth has spoken the truth, then sooner or later the Church will have to echo him, because until men accept God's judgment they will never discover His grace; until they yield to a negative despair they will never find a positive Gospel. Will Barth's doctrine of the atonement preach? What option has the preacher but to reckon with a doctrine which is so patently a Word of God to the human situation?

1. Barth's doctrine of the atonement speaks to man in his own soul. It speaks to man's aloneness, his lostness, his existential estrangement from God: " . . . man raises the question whether it is true that God is present and that He is lovingly concerned with His creatures." To man, the spiritual orphan, Barth proclaims the good news of an amazingly long-suffering Father God who wants His child even though His child has betrayed Him, who has taken the initiative in man's redemption and for the sake of us men and our salvation humbled Himself to our low estate, come where we are, stooped to our uttermost degradation, made our situation His situation, our peril and misery His peril and misery, and stood beside us even in our perishing condition. Even the atheist in the secret place of his soul longs to know the truth about God. The truth about God, says Barth, is Jesus Christ, the lowly, humble, obedient Son who suffered and died in the far country of man's disobedience; this, not some notion of supreme attributes, *is* God.

"I feel I must atone!" exclaims one of the "flatland" characters in

12. Frederick L. Herzog, "Theologian of the Word of God," An Article in *Theology Today*, Vol. XIII, No. 3, October 1956, p. 318.

T. S. Eliot's *The Cocktail Party*. Modern man may not be bothered by a sense of sin, but one cannot engage in the cure of souls without being terribly aware of human guilt and its devastating effect on mental health. Precisely because men cannot themselves "atone" for their moral failures, the festering source of neuroses still festers, poulticed but not healed by the inane platitudes of popular psychology. Even the easy assurances of religion, "Throw your sins on God," do little more than palliate, because guilt is at bottom a radical estrangement from One who, if encountered honestly, can only react in judgment and wrath. Barth faces with stern realism the problem of man's deepest self, and the answer which he enunciates, though fearful to contemplate, will alone strike a responsive chord in the hearts of men and women weary of a gospel which is not a Gospel but a half-humanistic compound of Christian ethics and mysticism. God, whether we like it or not, has Himself made atonement. In Jesus Christ our guilt has once and for all been dealt with. In Him our sin has been destroyed and with it *our future as sinners*. This is fact, not theory, and if it be true, then it must be preached.

2. Barth's doctrine of the atonement speaks to man in his social solidarity. It is in his larger relationships with society that modern man feels so bewildered and frustrated. Endless books and articles have been written to describe his predicament, his nuclear maturity and ethical immaturity, his mastery over nature and enslavement to his own passions. Why, thoughtful people ask, must man in every generation mock the flowering promise ahead of him and turn to embrace the ooze which he has worked a billion or two years to escape? The question remains unanswered, because it needs a mirror, not the pious moralisms of ethical humanists, to reveal the radical nature of our perennial predicament. That mirror, says Barth, is the act of God in Jesus Christ. In the light of that act, even our most subtle hypocrisies cannot conceal the basic sin of pride responsible for the strife and suffering of the centuries.

Man's real predicament, however, lies less in his moral duplicity than in his moral complacency, the crass illusion that he can be the man of pride with impunity, the enemy of God and "get away with it." Barth explodes this illusion with thunderous language, reminding man that even in his rebelliousness he cannot escape God, that even as the man of sin he must continue to live in God's sphere, and live, therefore, as the one to whom the grace of God shows itself in the form of wrath, the one who has been rejected, killed in the Cross of Jesus Christ. The preacher would have little popular appeal who ceased making communism the scapegoat for the world's ills and agreed with Barth in quoting Paul that God has concluded mankind and history in disobedience. More realistic, however, than hard-dying easy optimism about man's ability to control and improve his world is Barth's pessimism about "world history," his conviction that world history as such, i.e., "man on his own," has no future because God has concluded it in disobedience.

There is not a Divine "Yes" save that enclosed within the Divine "No." Only when men can look at the Cross of Jesus Christ and see, as Barth has seen, their own death in it, will they have grounds for any hope about life and the world. There is a "beyond" in relation to atonement, but a "beyond" visible only from the dark shadows of atonement itself. Beyond Good Friday is Easter Day, God's sovereign verdict on the obedience of His Son, God's justification of Himself, of His Son, and therefore of all men in Him. We who have died with Christ have also a future and a hope in Him—now in this time in His living presence, and at the end of time in His final manifestation—a faith and a hope "promised from the place whose sureness and unequivocal transcendence gives to the promise a clarity and certainty which are beyond comparison or compromise."[13] If this be the truth about man in his social solidarity, then it is a burning truth which the pulpit must proclaim with life-and-death urgency.

3. Barth's doctrine of the atonement speaks to man as a member of the Christian Community. What does it mean to be a Christian? What is salvation? Is it synonymous with conversion, a *fait accompli* somewhere in the past, or is it an eschatological concept realizable only beyond the bounds of space and history? The question must surely be answered, especially in the light of the Church's renewed concern with evangelism. Nothing could be more disastrous than that "evangelism" should fail to have adequate definition. Answers, however, have been as superficial as they are numerous, ranging all the way from a revival-meeting "decision" to identification with an institution which determines the destiny of souls even beyond the grave. The real dilemma, however, perplexes the man in-between, the conventional Protestant who, like the very human Paul, has made a Christian decision and identified himself with the Church, yet still finds himself in the grip of his old unregeneracy, wretched because of his failure to "measure up." How can a man be *simul peccator et iustus*? That question has reality for the sincere, thinking man in the pew of the average Church today. To that man Barth's doctrine makes sense; it is evangelism in terms that he can understand and accept. He rebels against a concept of salvation manifestly unreasonable and bizarre; but salvation defined in Pauline terms as a "history" of which he cannot be conscious, but which is real because it happened in Jesus Christ—that kind of salvation the modern Christian, and perhaps the modern non-Christian, will "decide for." Convinced of its truth, he *will* live on the basis of it, live as one forgiven, as an heir of God, as the inheritor of a great hope.

Yet not passively. With full admission of his own poverty and with full reliance on the justifying grace of God, the Christian still considers unworthy any doctrine that makes no demands of him, leaves no place for gratitude and self-oblation, no room for growth in sanctification. This fact adds point to a paradox—that man, who aspires to share in his own atonement has neither the power nor, in the last analysis, the will to participate

13. Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, IV, 1, p. 356.

in it. If Barth be accused of neglecting what has been called the "subjective" aspect of atonement, it may well be that as a preacher he became tired of making hypocrites of his own congregation. No higher challenge to growth in sanctification could be presented to any Christian than the challenge to "acknowledgment," "recognition" and "confession," as Barth has defined them. Yet who is sufficient for these things? Christian preaching might again become a Word of God to which men and women would listen if, instead of being a weekly moral "pep-talk," it witnessed to the awakening power of the Holy Spirit.

Will Barth's doctrine of the atonement preach? Not, perhaps, as Barth has formulated it. Indeed simply to "reproduce" Barth in the pulpit would be "Barthianism" of the most unpalatable variety and an injustice to Barth himself. For Barth has written for the theologian and for the preacher. Yet no preacher, having studied seriously his doctrine of the atonement in *Church Dogmatics* IV, 1, can fail to be influenced, perhaps revolutionized by it.

Book Reviews

The Faith of Israel: Aspects of Old Testament Thought. By H. H. Rowley. London: S.C.M. Press (Toronto: Ryerson), 1956. Pp. 220. $3.75.

In *The Faith of Israel* Professor Rowley has put us once more in his debt with a compact but comprehensive account of the theology of the Old Testament. The author has a facility for distilling the essence of a long argument and presenting the results in a clear and readable style. In a survey such as this there are invariably some matters which must be dealt with in summary fashion (e.g., the discussion of sacrifice, pp. 92-96); yet even in such passages Rowley manages to include many suggestive observations. The author displays an encyclopaedic knowledge of the literature in the field. Compendious footnotes introduce the student who wishes to proceed further to the pertinent literature and often provide succinct surveys of the variant scholarly interpretations of problem texts.

Professor Rowley recognizes the difficulty of writing a theology of the Old Testament where the timeless elements of revelation are linked to the changing circumstances of historical events over a long period of time. The problem is "to retain a historical sense, . . . while yet not turning our theology back into history" (p. 15). He follows A. B. Davidson's concept of genetic development and finds in the Old Testament a dynamic "unity of growth, and not a static unity" (p. 14).

In addition, there is the difficulty of selecting material and distinguishing important factors from irrelevant ones. Rowley warns against singling out acceptable ideas as distinctive of Israel's faith and discarding others as irrelevant. He equates the faith of Israel with distinctive elements present at first as "incipient ideas or principles which become formulated with increasing clarity in due course" (p. 17). In the process unessential elements such as blood revenge or the ban inflicted on conquered foes are gradually discarded. However, it is questionable whether desuetude necessarily indicates irrelevance for an earlier age. The ban, for example, was at one time regarded as a binding religious obligation, and its significance cannot be ignored in discerning the character of Israel's faith. Old Testament theology must take into account not only the passing event, but the passing practice in Israel's history.

The first chapter deals with the media of revelation. History and personality are singled out as the most significant media for Israel, and Rowley finds in "a complex of personality and event in certain moments of special significance" (p. 40) a medium of revelation unique to the Bible. He feels this is exemplified by Moses promising deliverance from Egypt and the subsequent event vindicating his faith.

He then proceeds to discuss the nature of God, emphasizing the unique role history played in Israel's faith. Events such as the Exodus from Egypt and the deliverance of Jerusalem from the armies of Sennacherib are of fundamental importance for the Old Testament conception of God. Israel's knowledge of God may, indeed, be said to be based on experience, rather than speculation. For some reason, however, Rowley stops short of applying this principle to the development of a doctrine of monotheism in Israel. While history is emphasized in relation to the Mosaic tradition of Yahweh's exclusive claims on Israel, Deutero-Isaiah is credited with setting forth "speculative monotheism" (p. 72). Yet even here it was not speculation, but the historical accomplishments of Cyrus which confounded the idol-worshippers of Babylon and persuaded the prophet that idol-gods were nonentities.

Three chapters are devoted to man and his need, the individual and the community, and the good life. One may be inclined to disagree with Rowley's contention that the image of God in Genesis is to be understood as a spiritual concept without any reference to physical form (pp. 74 ff.). That God is spirit did not for the Hebrew imply absence of form, but rather imperceptibility, until God chose to reveal himself. When he did so he was seen with a shape like a man (see Is. 6:1; Ezek. 1:26; etc.). It was because man shared this shape with God that he possessed those spiritual qualities or potentialities which permitted fellowship with God. However, the discussion in these chapters is good, and particularly apt with regard to the place of the individual in Israelite society.

The two concluding chapters deal with death and what lies beyond and with eschatology (the day of the Lord). The discussion of Sheol, resurrection, and immortality or life with God are a particularly clear and concise presentation of what the Old Testament has to say on these matters. Here, as throughout the book, Professor Rowley attempts to show the relation of Old Testament thought to the New Testament. The distinctive faith of Israel is uniquely related to Jesus Christ.

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The State in the New Testament. By O. Cullmann. London: S.C.M. (Toronto: Ryerson Press), 1957. Pp. 121. $2.50.

In his *Christ and Time* Professor Cullmann devoted a chapter to the New Testament doctrine of the State, of which the present volume is an elaboration. At that time he was quite naturally interested in the subject in so far as it threw light on his interpretation of New Testament eschatology. In his new book the preoccupation with eschatology persists. Eschatology, he seems to say, is not merely the framework but the very core of New Testament thought. "The 'not yet consummated' is to be emphasized just as

strongly as the 'already inaugurated.' Both together: that is the New Testament" (p. 88).

The Christian attitude to the State is a consequence of this "chronological dualism." There are two ages. The State belongs to the old order which is passing away. Christ and the Church belong to the new age which is here and yet still to come. As long as God wills the continuance of the old order the Christian owes a limited allegiance to the State. But because he belongs to the new age he can never give absolute obedience to anything in the Old. The one side of the picture is portrayed in Romans 13, where the State remains within its proper sphere, the other in Revelation 13, where the State becomes Satanic by demanding the worship which is due only to God; and both have their origin in the attitude and teaching of Jesus.

Jesus' attitude to the State is to be seen not only in the episode of the tribute money but pre-eminently in his dealings with the Zealots, which were more extensive than most of us had formerly supposed. Simon was not the only Zealot among the Twelve. Judas was a Zealot—Iscariot being a corruption of the Latin *sicarius*; Peter was a Zealot—Barjona being Accadian for terrorist; and the sons of Zebedee were Zealots in temperament if not in party membership. Jesus agreed with the Zealots in expecting the Kingdom of God to supersede the present order but disagreed with them in accepting the present order while it lasted. To him the Zealot ideal of a theocratic State making divine claims was no less totalitarian and Satanic than Rome. Although Jesus repudiated the Zealot programme and methods, he could not repudiate their fundamental hope, and he was crucified by the Roman government as a Zealot leader. This last point is strongly emphasized though it does not advance the main argument, since Cullmann concludes that in the Crucifixion the Roman State was not Satanic but merely misinformed.

The difficulties of Cullmann's hypothesis emerge most clearly in the later chapters. Here we are told (p. 87) that the apparent contradiction between Romans 13 and Revelation 13 "lies in the chronological dualism, the chronological tension, which characterizes the New Testament situation." This surely implies that before the beginning of the chronological dualism, that is, before the coming of the Kingdom in Christ, there was no such thing as a divided loyalty between God and the State; but would Socrates or the author of the book of Daniel have agreed?

Again we are told repeatedly that the State belongs to the old age. But the principalities and powers who stand behind the old order "are God's servants and have indeed sound judgment over good and evil" only because they have been brought by the Cross into subjection to Christ (p. 69). One would have thought that anyone who was brought into God's service by the Cross would be to some extent at least in the new age over which Christ's authority is exercised. It would seem to follow also that before the coming of Christ the State had no authority under God; but would Paul have agreed?

Perhaps we might avoid such conundrums if we started from the assumption that the centre of New Testament teaching is not eschatology but God.

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Promise and Fulfilment: The eschatological Message of Jesus (Studies in Biblical Theology, No. 23). By Werner Georg Kummel. London: S.C.M. Press (Toronto: Ryerson Press), 1957. Pp. 168. $2.50

Without doubt this is an important contribution to a subject that has fundamental significance, and it should be noted that the author had in mind the needs of contemporary preachers (p. 7).

He rejects the purely futurist view of A. Schweitzer and M. Werner, the "realized eschatology" of C. H. Dodd, and the very difficult idea that Jesus was really indifferent to the time factors (Delling, J. W. Bowman, and others). His argument is close knit and based on rigorous exegetical methods: (*a*) Jesus proclaimed that the Kingdom could be expected soon (Mark 1:15; 14:25; Luke 18:8). (*b*) It would arrive within the lifetime of his own generation (Mark 9:1; 13:30; Matt. 10:23), though not before his death (p. 29). Jesus predicted his violent death (Mark 10: 35 ff.), without, however, regarding himself as the Suffering Servant (p. 73; in spite of Mark 10:45 where the reference to Isaiah is admitted by Kümmel). (*c*) The Kingdom was present in Jesus, his person, actions, and message (Mark 11:1-10; Luke 7:18 ff.; 10:23 f.; 11:20, "has come upon you;" 17:21, "is among you;" and Matt. 11:12). It is present "in advance," paradoxically, as if it had no right to be there! Nevertheless, (*d*) The hour of its coming was not known (Mark 13:32; Luke 17:20 f., 24), for Jesus rejected all apocalyptic schemes. Kümmel removes Mark 13: 7, 8, 12, 14-20, 24-27 as unauthentic, because they have no parallels in the eschatological message. (*e*) There was to be an interval between the death of Jesus and the Parousia (Mark 2:18 ff.), when he will return as the Son of Man and Judge (Mark 8:38; Luke 12:8, Q; Matt. 25:31 ff.; Luke 11:31 f.; 17:26 f.). Kümmel says emphatically that "Son of Man" cannot have a collective meaning, as T. W. Manson has suggested. In a detailed exegesis of the parables concerned he also denies that Jesus taught the growth of the Kingdom. It is present in Jesus alone; and it will come when he returns.

What does such a message mean? We must recognize first that Jesus was mistaken in expecting the Parousia in the lifetime of that generation (Mark 9:1 is contradicted by 13:32). No solution to the problem thus posed can

be offered, and it is not important anyway (three references only). The presence of Jesus was a *real* eschatological presence (p. 153), confronting men with the end of history, admonishing them that their attitude to Jesus would determine their destiny, using contemporary idioms. The disciples may hope, because they see the powers of the new age at work proleptically in Jesus. And the Kingdom that is to come is the Kingdom of that God whom Jesus revealed in his message and in his life of love. Promise and fulfilment are thus inseparable, and the true meaning is the news of the divine authority of Jesus. How can we accept such an authority, if the records are so contradictory and ambiguous? Because, says Kümmel, we know of the Resurrection and of the divine founding of the Church through the gift of the Spirit.

This is a painstaking book—there are 449 footnotes in 140 pages, and 237 authors are cited in the Index. The writer has faced the evidence with a fresh, critical mind, in full awareness of the state of the debate. Yet he leaves this reviewer dissatisfied: (*a*) He is not quite fair to Dodd's position about the "residue of eschatology," and should consider the alternative translation of Mark 9:1 ("some standing here will see that the Kingdom has come with power"). (*b*) He does far less than justice to the corporate elements in all the Messianic concepts: King, High Priest, Son of Man, and Prophet. Jesus may have begun to gather a *yachad*, a *chabbura,* i.e. a community of disciples who awaited the final dénouement and constituted the nucleus of a new people of God. If so, this must be related to the presence of the Kingdom. (*c*) The strength of the case for Jesus' having predicated the mission of the Son of Man to the work of the Suffering Servant is not well represented (see W. Manson, *Jesus the Messiah*, and T. W. Manson, *The Servant Messiah*). (*d*) If Jesus was mistaken about the time of the End, may he not also have been in error about the entire premise, namely, the conviction that the Kingdom of God was present in himself? Is his ignorance compatible with genuine self-awareness of his status as the heavenly Son of Man who will come to be the Judge of mankind? It would be better to explore again the idea that Jesus' ideas about his mission underwent a true development during his ministry. (*e*) When one sees the array of scholars lined up for the several theories, one tends to despair. Despite his own assurance of what is "perfectly clear" (p. 126), we may be pretty sure that Kümmel has not said the last word. It may well be he who is "quite mistaken" in the denial that the Kingdom was present "in the life of Jesus' disciples." He sounds altogether too confident in this book.

My final query is whether this very technical volume really belongs in a series of relatively short, cheap monographs.

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The Holy Spirit and Eschatology in Paul. By Neill Q. Hamilton (*Scottish Journal of Theology Occasional Papers* No. 6). Edinburgh and London: Oliver and Boyd, Ltd., 1957. Pp. vii, 94. 8s. 6d.

Hamilton's study in Pauline theology, submitted as a Dr.Theol. thesis to the University of Basel, takes Professor Cullmann's conclusions in his book *Christ and Time* as a foundation (p. 2). Hamilton then proceeds to discuss "The Holy Spirit and the Lord" by offering detailed exegeses of Pauline passages which relate the Spirit and Christ. A second chapter deals with "The Holy Spirit and Time;" it affirms that the present is to be understood as the time "in which for Christians the future age is breaking-in in the Spirit" (p. 24). Chapter III discusses "The Spirit and the Eschatological Tension of Christian Life." The thesis of this chapter is that the Spirit bridges the dialectic of present and future or of the already-fulfilled and the not-yet-fulfilled of the believer's situation (p. 26), and thus "the present life of the Christian is determined by the Spirit" (p. 30). In this light sonship, faith, hope, love, prayer, and glorification are discussed as aspects of Christian life which illustrate "this tension of already and not yet" (pp. 32 f.).

The three chapters which follow compare the results reached with current opinions in New Testament studies. A. Schweitzer's "consistent eschatology" ("*Konsequente Eschatologie*") is Hamilton's first subject. After a summary and characterization of Schweitzer's "consistent eschatology" he comes to the conclusion that Schweitzer's suggestion of a programme of creative theology necessary for today "amounts to the recommendation of a shift from the eschatological-Christological Spirit of Paul to a reliance on 'the Spirit' pure and simple" (p. 50).

The fifth chapter deals with C. H. Dodd's concept of "realised eschatology," that is, "that 'for the New Testament writers in general, the eschaton has entered history; . . . the Age to come has come'" (p. 54). "All the future elements in eschatology, the hoped-for last things, the consummation of redemption, the future Age—these have all been present since the Advent of Jesus Christ" (*ibid.*). In his evaluation of C. H. Dodd's concept of "realised eschatology," Hamilton suggests "that the primary concern it expresses is to make the Gospel relevant to modern history and the life of today without at all sacrificing anything of the truth of the Gospel" (*ibid.*). A characterization of the three ways in which Dodd "disposes of apocalyptical elements in the New Testament" (p. 57) is concluded by an examination of his concept of time which is Platonic rather than Hebraic: "time is, as Plato said, 'the moving image of eternity'" (C. H. Dodd, *The Apostolic Preaching* . . . , 1936, pp. 87–8). The author concludes that even though Dodd's concept of "realised eschatology" has many strong points to commend it, it changes, as far as Dodd's interpretation of Paul is concerned, the tension "between the already-present and the not-yet-fulfilled" into a tension "between the absolute and the relative" (p. 70).

R.. Bultmann's "reinterpreted eschatology" is the object of the sixth chapter of Hamilton's study. Bultmann affirms that it is the task of Biblical scholarship to bring out the "real intention" of the Biblical authors, a task which necessitates a re-interpretation of the Biblical witness, piercing through the now obsolete mythological view of the world, because "the real purpose of myth is not to present an objective picture of the world as it is, but to express man's understanding of himself in the world in which he lives. Myth should be interpreted not cosmologically, but anthropologically . . ." (R. Bultmann, *Kerygma and Myth*, p. 10). But the result of this re-interpretation is "to reduce time, the eschatological age to come and the Spirit which is the agent of that age, to merely subjective experiences of the 'man of faith' " (p. 81).

In a final chapter Hamilton, after examining common modern objections to eschatology (such as the drawing up of "a cosmic time table" (p. 88), or its "enervating effect upon man, making him content with evil and injustice in the present" (p. 89), or the opinion "that its keynotes are doom, destruction, and judgement" (*ibid.*), or "that it is simply incompatible with modern thinking" (p. 90)), asserts that the Church must teach and preach "a faithfully Biblical eschatology in its proper relation, and with the proper emphasis" (*ibid.*).

This rather extensive summary was necessary in order to give the reader an impression of the author's arguments and results as well as of the arguments of his counter-parts. Hamilton has succeeded in both offering a balanced exegesis of the crucial Pauline passages as well as clearly characterizing the respective positions of A. Schweitzer, C. H. Dodd, and R. Bultmann. He has thus opened before the reader the important question as to the function of eschatology in Christian theology, especially in New Testament exegesis. There are many theologians who have adopted one or the other of the above-mentioned interpretations of eschatology. To them as well as to those who have not as yet been able squarely to face and solve this basic question—and the reviewer confesses to being one of them—Hamilton's study is a challenge. Everybody who takes seriously his plea for a faithfully Biblical eschatology must admit that the New Testament witnesses are not unanimous on this basic issue; cf. Mark 13:3 ff. with John 5:24 f. Furthermore, a comparison of 1. Thess. 4:13–17 with Phil. 1:23 shows a contradiction in Paul himself: Is Christ's Second Coming or is the death of the individual believer the beginning of the "being with Christ forever?" Did Paul change his concept in this regard, as C. H. Dodd affirms, or did he not change it, as Hamilton affirms (pp. 61 ff.), or does this contradiction merely show that the one and only essential thing is the "being with Christ forever" (1 Thess. 4:17b), and that the way in which this "being with Christ forever" becomes real belongs to "the things that are unseen" (2 Cor. 4:18)?

Another question arises in connection with Hamilton's short discussion of the common modern objection that Biblical eschatology "is simply incom-

patible with modern thinking" (p. 90): How are passages like 1 Thess. 4:13–17 to be interpreted? Should one by-pass the apocalyptical concept of vv. 16–17a (the call of the archangel, the sound of the trumpet of God etc.) in order to stress heavily v. 17b (". . . and so we shall always be with the Lord.")? Does not on the other hand the preaching of passages like vv. 16–17a make faith a *sacrificium intellectus*? Is it legitimate to stress the "that," the fact of the Second Coming of Jesus Christ and to declare the "how" to be of secondary importance? In any case, Hamilton's study has clarified the issues at stake and he has presented his argument well. Who dares to speak the final word?

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The Gospel from the Mount; a New Translation and Interpretation of Matthew, Chs. 5 to 7. By John W. Bowman and Roland W. Tapp. Philadelphia: Westminster Press (Toronto: Ryerson Press), 1957. Pp. 189. $3.75.

Dr. Bowman is a clear and forthright interpreter of Scripture. Among the multitude of expositors of the Sermon on the Mount he moves with sure and steady step. He modestly announces his intention to "popularize" certain interpretations of the Sermon which he has given to students on three continents for some thirty years. Readers of this meaty volume will be grateful for his decision. But this is no mere rehash of classroom notes: it is a fresh and penetrating approach to these hundred odd verses of Matthew and to their immeasurable significance.

Although theological polemics are not emphasized, it is clear that Dr. Bowman stands in definite opposition to the apocalypticism of Schweitzer. Not for a moment will he regard the "ethics" of the Sermon as "interim." Neither is the Sermon a code of rules for living, nor is it merely a sort of "distillation" of the essence of Christian ethics apart from the Gospel. Rather, Dr. Bowman affirms, the Sermon *is* gospel. It is "The Gospel of the Divine Lordship or Sovereignty." It begins, not as is usually supposed, with Matthew 5:1, but with Matthew 4:23: "Jesus went about . . . teaching and preaching the gospel of the kingdom." The Sermon is the preaching of that Gospel. It is not the giving of a new law to the disciples to correspond with the old law given from Sinai to Israel by Moses. It is rather the way in which Jesus called men to accept God's rule over their lives in wholehearted allegiance to Him.

The theme of the Sermon is therefore *grace* or *gospel*, not law. Thus the first word of the first beatitude is *blessed*. Dr. Bowman interprets this as "God's gift to you," and maintains that the Beatitudes proclaim the blessing of God upon successive stages of the development of Christian personality.

He divides the Beatitudes into stanzas, and in each one he discerns a progressive portrait of Christian experience. The first stanza includes the first four Beatitudes, and these involve the realization of personal inadequacy, repentance, trust in God alone, and earnest longing for total righteousness. (These same factors are involved in the Parable of the Prodigal Son and in frequent further applications in the teaching of Jesus.) The second stanza, which includes Beatitudes five to eight, is strikingly related by Dr. Bowman to Psalm 85. The attributes of God there depicted, mercy, truth, righteousness and peace, are in these Beatitudes transferred to man. Thus Salvation is clearly set forth as having *entered into* man's experience by the gracious gift of God. Men are enabled to live in and partake of the grace provided by God as saved personalities forced to live in an unsaved world. The eschatology of the Beatitudes, and of the Sermon, is prophetic, not apocalyptic.

The difficult *crux interpretum* in Matthew 5:17-20 is resolutely shouldered. Dr. Bowman unhesitatingly attributes these words to Jesus. The "law" here refers to the whole Old Testament revelation of God, and the righteous will of God for man. This is the "law" which Jesus has come to fulfill. Thus his will is not to lessen the demands of the law, but to sharpen them. But the righteousness of God can only be attained as God *gives* His righteousness to man, and as man turns to God with a pure heart and with a resolute purpose to walk in the way of God's will.

A complete new translation of the Sermon is given, and Aramaic suggestions are strikingly employed, e.g., "Give not a ring to dogs, cast not your pearls before swine"; "Give us our bread day by day"; "Be adults, then, as your Heavenly Father is of perfect stature."

Dr. Bowman and his research colleague, Dr. Roland W. Tapp, have given the inquiring reader a most helpful and constructive interpretation of the Sermon. But at the very outset the reader must make his own terms with the authors' assumption that the Sermon *is* a Sermon—"perhaps the best-known example of a Sermon preached by our Lord." And the theological patterns which are discerned throughout the Sermon must be assayed with discriminating care. But this is a book which evokes sincere gratitude for its writing. It meets a need.

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The Wisdom of the Fathers. By Erik Routley. London: S.C.M. Press (Toronto: Ryerson Press), 1957. Pp. 128. $1.75.

Dr. Erik Routley has written a book "primarily for younger people," almost all of whom will be non-professional theologians, to introduce them "to the wisdom of the Fathers." The work deals in eight chapters with the

contribution of seven of the Fathers, Origen, Clement of Alexandria, Athanasius, Augustine, Cyprian, Basil and John of Damascus.

Apart from John of Damascus, all the Fathers thus introduced belong to the period between the third and the fifth centuries of the Christian era, and each one is presented because of his distinctive comment upon the particular issue which Dr. Routley insists has contemporary significance and relevance.

The book has all the vivacity and penetration which we have now come to associate with Professor Routley's writings. His style is particularly attractive to newcomers to Christian dogmatics and he has a "zest" in dealing with his subject which is contagious and exhilarating.

He is at his best in this book in his treatment of Basil, "On Asceticism and the Art of Conversation," and John of Damascus, "On Visual Aids," and his young readers will be stimulated to think—"given furiously to think," as some would say. His chapter on Athanasius is a moving tribute to one who cared for "the deep things of the faith," and his patient yet firm handling of literalists, cultural pagans, and moralistic demagogues, through the writings of Origen, Clement, and Cyprian, is eloquent both of his own obedience to the gospel and of his sympathy with those who do not share his understanding.

Dr. Routley's presentation of the doctrines of grace and freedom in Augustine cannot be other than stimulating and refreshing, and it is a rare achievement to be able to make the Fathers our contemporaries and to evaluate their observations on modern issues by means of such an intelligible and attractive an idiom as has been chosen.

I found his discussion on disunity as a sin in chapter five strangely weak and unconvincing. Perhaps his insistence on the phrase "disunity is a sin," rather than on such a phrase as "disunity is sinful" may account for this. Disunity in the area of obedience which we know as the Body of Christ involves both our relation to God and to our fellow believers, and it seems difficult to cavil at the word "sin" when the seamless robe of Christ is torn by the hands of men. If such tearing is not sin, then we must find another word for it.

But this observation is an indication of the way in which all who read are forced to think—and, what is more, to think clearly and faithfully in the realm of Christian truth and loyalty.

Though the book is written in a lucid style, conversational in tone and pleasant in spirit, it is singularly free from the "cleverness" of a theological "smart Alec" who is out to make an impression. Professor Routley's reproduction of the kind of reply which the Cadwaladers would have made, betrays a superficial acquaintance with the Welsh way of speaking which is perhaps excusable, and it is a very minor blemish in a book which is one of the most valuable to place in the hands of young people. It is an introduction to Christian apologetics which can be warmly commended and

fulfills the rich promise of the earlier works of Dr. Routley both in music and in theology.

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Bradwardine and the Pelagians; a Study of his 'De Causa Dei' and its Opponents (*Studies in Medieval Life and Thought*, N.S. vol. 5). By GORDON LEFF. Cambridge: University Press (Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada), 1957. Pp. xi, 282. $5.50.

A SURVEY of historical research in the last two decades reveals an increasing number of monographs devoted to an analysis of the Later Middle Ages as a period of crisis and transition in European history. The reason for this growing interest is not hard to discover. The student of the past always beholds the object of his study through the glass of his existential situation. More briefly, deep calls to deep. Born as he is of a period of confusion and uncertainty, it therefore occasions no surprise when the historian of this generation finds himself drawn towards the investigation of an earlier age of equal confusion and uncertainty: Europe in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, a time when Western society, shaken loose from its moorings in the world of the Middle Ages by a series of radical developments in almost every area of human life, entered upon a new period in its history. Much historical research remains to be done, particularly in the realm of the history of thought where our understanding is far from perfect. Thanks to the labours of many specialists, we know that the crisis of the Later Middle Ages was profoundly experienced in the realm of theology and philosophy. However, the exact nature, or better, the manifold ramifications of that crisis, are still somewhat opaque to us. And since it is the special purpose of Leff's monograph, the latest addition to the *Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought*, to increase our understanding of this fundamental development, it may be safely prophesied that his work will receive the closest attention and the warmest welcome by all those concerned with the history of Europe at the inception of the Modern Age.

As to the life of the English theologian Thomas Bradwardine, its salient points are quickly rehearsed: Born *ca.* 1290 in Sussex, Bradwardine received his master's degree in Theology from Oxford in 1323 and acted as provost of that university from 1325 to 1327. In 1335, like many another theologian of that century, he was drawn away from academic life into royal service. In time, Bradwardine's labours had their reward. At Avignon, in July, 1349, he was consecrated Archbishop of Canterbury. Whether or not his pontificate would have proved auspicious for both Church and State must remain unknown: Bradwardine was dead of the plague in Lambeth Palace six weeks later.

Ostensibly, it is Leff's intention to direct us towards a more profound understanding of Bradwardine's lengthy treatise, *De causa Dei*. Yet embracing as it does both the theological teaching of Bradwardine and that of his opponents, notably William of Occam, the monograph becomes in effect an essay on theological and philosophical developments in the fourteenth century. Its special theme therefore is the collapse of that noble attempt by the thirteenth century Schoolmen to build up within the orbit of faith an ordered structure of reason, a collapse brought about by the estrangement of nature from supernature in almost every phase of Christian thinking. The central figure in this radical development was William of Occam. Guided by a philosophical technique more truly logical than metaphysical, Occam rejected the validity of all knowledge of God by analogy and barred all understanding of God, His nature and attributes, from entrance into any rational argument. Thus Occam shattered the traditional intellectual vision of reality as an ordered whole, dependent in its contingent existence upon God, the Necessary Existent. To this philosophical attitude Occam conjoined, on the theological side of his thought, his teaching concerning the divine liberty, a notion derived from Scotus (Occam's favorite adversary), in whose system God could act with such freedom that His ways were placed beyond any investigation by the human reason and therefore no relation could be posited between His activity and that of His creatures. It should be clearly understood that this was no mere sophistry, a form of elegant yet sterile intellectual debate. The doctrine of God and His *potentia absoluta* as outside the human situation *totaliter*, combined with the philosophical reluctance of Occam to admit the existence of any power or quality of which the human mind had no direct experience, struck at the roots of the traditional doctrine of grace. The reality and necessity of grace as an infused power in the soul were placed in question; the human will was given an independence and power far surpassing even the most sanguine speculations of previous medieval theologians, and the nascent secularism of Christian Europe was granted its justification by both theology and philosophy.

In direct opposition to Occam stands Bradwardine. If Occam set reason free from revelation and the will from grace, Bradwardine swallowed reason in faith, the will in grace, allowing the creature no shred of independence and autonomy, however defined, in his dealings with his Creator. Indeed, so rigorous was Bradwardine's understanding of God as All, that it was almost as if creation were absorbed into the Being of a Creator whose relation to His creation was immediate, all-embracing and final. In this violent duality between Bradwardine and Occam, Leff adumbrates the eventual disintegration of the medieval mind.

It is no small tribute to Leff's skill that these controversies, so alien to most of us, become luminous and endowed with vitality and fascination. Yet at times, the reader will stumble on *obiter dicta* which are confusing and annoying. While Leff is certainly justified in his attempt to assess

critically Bradwardine's transcendentalist theology, there seems to be little purpose in describing him as "unlovable," anti-humanistic and all the rest. One suspects that here Leff has fallen prey to that tiresome convention which dictates that all theologians who exalt the power of God somewhat unduly must be viewed with suspicion as something more, and less, than human. Further, when Leff attempts to generalize, the results occasionally cast more shadow than light. True, all historians of ideas must generalize since the tracing of the dynamic function of ideas in history is the proper object of their study. Yet, is there sufficient justification for drawing such a straight line, as Leff does, from Bradwardine to Luther and Calvin? Did not the Reformers unlock a new theological spirit forgotten and ignored by the controversies in the Schools? That the collapse of the medieval synthesis paved the way for the Reformation no one can deny, but it is too simple to suggest, as Leff repeatedly does, that from Bradwardine it is but a short step to the Reformers.

Nevertheless, this is an excellent monograph. Unfortunately, few besides the specialist will read it. Those who do so will not regret it. These ancient controversies had genuine excitement, urgency and significance, and, viewed from certain aspects, they are, if not parallel to, at least suggestive of the theological tensions in our own day.

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Activities of the Puritan Faction of the Church of England, 1625-33. Edited and with an Introduction by Isabel M. Calder. Published for the Church Historical Society. London: S.P.C.K. (Toronto: Anglican Book Centre), 1957. Pp. xxiv, 156. $5.00.

Uniformity of theological opinion has never been a characteristic of members of the reformed Church of England. It has frequently happened that groups and individuals within that Church have felt it necessary to spread their opinions in ways which were officially unwelcome. In the nineteenth century, for example, the Simeon Trust, formed to ensure Evangelical leadership in a number of prominent churches, was not wholly popular with ecclesiastical authority. The use of private chapels by Methodists and Evangelicals to proclaim their distinctive doctrines earned orthodox frowns in the eighteenth century. As the book under review illustrates, a method adopted for the propagation of Puritan notions in the seventeenth century was not merely disapproved of but quashed by legal process.

On February 15, 1626, four clergymen, four lawyers and four merchants met in London to plan for the support and preservation of a Puritan ministry in the Established Church. They formed themselves into an unofficial body of feoffees or trustees, drew up a set of rules, and proceeded to raise money to forward their aims. Their first project was to purchase

impropriations, that is, ecclesiastical revenue in lay hands. By gift and purchase they also obtained advowsons—the right to present a clergyman to a bishop to be inducted into a benefice—and the nomination of curates, preachers, lecturers and schoolmasters. Within seven years the feoffees had received £6300 and had spent considerably more, so that, as they said, "they are soe farr from gayning or reserving any part to themselves that they are out of their owne purses." For the most part the clergy and others supported out of this Charity were not rectors or vicars with cure of souls but "dative and removeable men" who presumably were not instituted and inducted into benefices, and for whose appointment the bishop's approval was not needed. The principal duty of the appointees was either to preach or to teach. The feoffees also paid particular attention to placing their preachers in towns represented in the House of Commons, so that political as well as religious motives lay behind their corporate conduct.

From the beginning of Queen Elizabeth's reign, lectures, usually of a Calvinist cast, had been delivered early on week-day mornings at St. Antholin's Church in London. The feoffees gained the support of the Rector of St. Antholin's, increased the number of lecturers, raised their salary, and used this London church as a kind of seminary for training Puritan preachers.

In his *Church History of Britain* Thomas Fuller describes in the following words the inevitable consequence of the activities just described: "Archbishop Laud began to look with a jealous eye on the feoffees for impropriations, as who in process of time would prove a thorn in the sides of episcopacy, and by their preachers become the prime patrons, for number and greatness of benefices." Accordingly, information was laid by the Attorney-General before the Equity Side of the Court of Exchequer, and the case was argued before the Court by lawyers. The upshot was that the Court brought in a decree against the feoffees and ordered their enterprise to be dissolved. Fuller adds: "Their criminal part was referred to, but never prosecuted in, the Star-chamber; because the design was generally approved, and both discreet and devout men were . . . doleful at the ruin of so pious a project."

Activities of the Puritan Faction of the Church of England, 1625-33 concentrates on the incident just outlined. It reprints the documents relating to the case, originals of which are preserved in the Public Record Office. The documents themselves are self-explanatory although legal repetitiveness makes them tedious to read, but the editor's lucid introduction and notes make all plain. A study of the case reveals the political and ecclesiastical tensions which were being built up in the fateful years preceding the Great Rebellion. Miss Calder's little book helps to illuminate Puritan thought and action and makes a useful contribution to the ever-growing literature on the subject.

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The Authority of Scripture: A Study of the Reformation and Post-Reformation Understanding of the Bible. By J. K. S. Reid. London: Methuen & Co. (Toronto: Ryerson), 1957. Pp. 286. $5.00.

Fundamentalism and the Church of God. By Gabriel Hebert. London: S.C.M. Press (Toronto: Ryerson), 1957. Pp. 156. $3.00.

The problem of the inspiration and authority of Holy Scripture has not been treated so systematically as we might expect. Usually this subject is approached only accidentally or in a party spirit. Here are two books, however, which combine a calm and objective approach, a full recognition of the deep issues involved, and a serious grappling with historical and contemporary theology.

Although various in method and scope, both books share certain significant theses. The importance of the "analogy of Christ" in arguing for both the true humanity and the true divinity of Scripture is advanced explicitly by Hebert (pp. 77 f.), and in the context of expounding Barth's teaching by Reid (pp. 210 ff.). The doctrine of infallibility associated with the Fundamentalist movement is said to be a distinctively modern idea, involving "a materialistic notion of what Truth is" (Hebert, p. 96). Reid follows Hebert here (p. 158, referring to Hebert's former *The Authority of the Old Testament*) and sums up: "When this bare literalism is in turn allied to the expectation of finding in Scripture the same kind of thing that is so successfully supplied by science, as happens in modern fundamentalism, then there emerges the 'new doctrine' of infallibility of modern times which has no real precedent in previous ages" (p. 160).

Professor Reid's book is the longer and more exhaustive study. He is concerned about "the grievous loss in authority which the Bible has sustained in modern days" (p. 28). Concentrating on the Reformation and its successive theologies, he gives us admirable historical Chapters on Calvin, Lutheran and Reformed Orthodoxy, Romanism (which, after all, is a phenomenon produced by reaction to the Reformation!) and the Theology of the Word. The Chapter on Calvin reflects the same incisive examination of the sources which Reid has already made in regard to the doctrine of predestination (*Scottish Journal of Theology*, Volume I). But it is significant that although the general thesis is identical—that Calvin displays an ambiguity or perhaps a dialectic—he is able to credit Calvin with the proper emphasis here, which he did not do in his former study. Yet the question is far from settled, as Reid himself acknowledges in his Supplementary Note on this "admittedly perplexing" question. He rejects E. A. Dowey's thesis that Calvin shared the belief in a hypothetical original document as infallible, and suggests rather an "indirect identity" of Scripture and Word of God, a substantial but not literal identity.

Luther research has given us a consistent picture of the man who regarded James as a "right strawy" epistle; but Calvin research is still divided in its conclusions. Thus Reid gives an excellent summary of Luther

at the crossroads (p. 61), Luther stressing "what treats of Christ" (p. 67), Luther achieving unity of subject and object in his doctrine of Scripture (p. 71). Regarding Calvin, on the other hand, Reid barely mentions a subject which in the opinion of this reviewer deserves a much greater place, the concept of the accommodation or condescension of the divine Word to human sensible and sinful infirmity. Hebert, indeed, makes much of this element, in the form of Chrysostom's *synkatabasis* (p. 59, cf. Reid, p. 86 f.).

Professor Reid has given a notable exposition of the development of Lutheran and Reformed orthodoxy—the *rigor scholasticus*, involving an apologetic for Flacius as one who stood against the stream. One wishes he had ventured likewise on behalf of Melanchthon, whom he treats conventionally as the father of Protestant scholasticism (p. 79 ff.). On the Roman view, Reid is thorough and helpful. He provides a much needed way through the subtleties and complexities of Roman doctrines of Scripture, tradition, Living Voice and development. Here is a Church which begins with the infallibility of Scripture, but ends with that post-Newman developmental theory which has created "the Church speaking . . . a Titanism or a Prometheanism which must be rejected" (p. 115). Thus even its encouraging approach (e.g. in the 1953 *Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture*) to form-critical problems is straitjacketed within its scope and purpose.

Revelation and inspiration—Reid rightly sees the connection and the priority of the former—form the theme of two more general chapters. "The Bible can be regarded as a book both human and divine. There is no need to regard it, as those holding verbal inspiration must do, as though it were an incarnation of the Holy Spirit and so exempt from error" (p. 169). Nor is there "progressive revelation"—"that man can have God on the instalment plan"!—but rather a process from promise to fulfilment. This idea is examined more closely in terms of the Barth-Brunner theology of the Word. The chapter is most stimulating, stressing categories of action and event, difference in "times," and the true humanity of the Word. A still unanswered question is Barth's "real or supposed apostolicity," the criterion or canon of the canon itself. For instance, the significance of the Acts 9 story for Paul's authority seems to have been much greater for Paul himself (I Cor. 9:1) than for the theologians of the Word!

Reid's concluding Chapter goes straight to the heart of this problem of authority, namely the christological unity of Scripture, the presence of Christ in the Old Testament. Here he works out a "legitimate typology" (p. 251) based on "the divine saving pattern" which links prophecy and fulfilment. The locus of authority is "in that element within it which from other points of view is eccentric" (p. 277). No human category is appropriate to this witness, for God "chooses to speak in and through it;" "God marches up and down through the Bible magisterially." This apparently circular argumentation presses home the ultimate problem of revelation itself: " . . . the Bible is the Word of God, not in the sense that God's

Word is petrified in a dead record, but that the Bible is vivified by His living presence to convey what He has to say."

The Australian Anglican Hebert shows a great measure of agreement. He writes, however, with an explicitly eirenic purpose, to bring I.V.F. and S.C.M. groups together, in conversation at least. His easy style combines with this personal purpose to make vibrant as well as profitable reading. Hebert has introduced his subject by p. 27, with a splendid analysis of "the right way of controversy" and a brief historical sketch of "The Fundamentals"—the series of booklets which began to appear under that title in 1909. For Hebert, "fundamentalism" describes that historical phenomenon, while "conservative evangelicalism" is the contemporary successor.

When Hebert attacks the problem of a positive reconstruction of the true doctrine of Scriptural authority, he too sees a pattern operative: "The Bible and God's Saving Purpose." This leads him to deal at length with questions about the kind of truth and therefore the kind of authority which belongs to Scripture. He too is concerned with the place of Christ in the Old Testament and about the "inadequacy" (Reformed theology used to say "impropriety") of human formulations of divine truth. Here he uses the christological analogy, "the pattern of divine condescension" in Incarnation, Church, Sacrament and Scripture. But this involves the temptation to monophysitic or docetic heresy in each case. Therefore, " . . . we have to discern the treasure in the earthen vessels" (p. 78).

Hebert illustrates his thesis in a critique of the *New Bible Commentary* (IVF, 1953), and an excursus of some thirteen pages which is a treasure. This is his translation of portions of a Swedish novel, *Stengrunden* ("Stony Ground") which describes the issues of revivalism in terms of the Swedish situation towards the end of last century. The story of a young "evangelical" pastor and his "experience" is sufficient commentary on Hebert's understanding of the tension between these two student groups which are themselves children of rival factions within the Church. He deplores "this alarming phenomenon" of an immature and yet "closed" faith on the part of "evangelical" young people (p. 141). Whether Hebert's book will convince the conservative evangelicals whom he seeks to meet sympathetically and honestly is a moot question. Yet his effort is one of the most encouraging of our rapidly changing situation. This unhappy controversy, still continuing in anachronistic fashion on this Continent at least, may well find new channels prepared for it if Gabriel Hebert's challenge is taken up by men of like scholarship, who endeavour to speak the truth "in love."

To recommend Reid and Hebert to theologians and especially to "working Ministers" is but a first step—to urge the taking up of their purpose and approach and subject-matter is imperative.

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Christ and His Church. By ANDERS NYGREN. Translated by ALAN CARLSTEN. Philadelphia: Westminster Press (Toronto: Ryerson Press), 1956, and London: S.P.C.K. (Toronto: Anglican Book Centre), 1957, Pp. 125.

Christ and His Church is the substance of the series of lectures delivered by Bishop Nygren in inaugurating the Laidlaw Lectureship at Knox College, Toronto, in September, 1954. While the material was especially prepared for the occasion it represents the fruition of Bishop Nygren's thought since becoming convinced at the Edinburgh Conference in 1937 that true ecumenicity must arise out of the deep things of faith rather than the so-called practical matters. The reader can therefore expect to find in this volume a penetrating analysis of the nature of the Church and its unity.

The author's purpose is "to show how the Church has its ground in Christ and how this and nothing else is the basis of the unity of the Church" (p. 11). The book is thus a thoroughly Christological interpretation of the Church, a lucid discussion of the biblical description of the Church as the Body of Christ. Nygren's central thesis is that the essence of the Church is to be found in its unity with Christ and its participation in Him. In other words, Christ Himself is the essence of the Church and therefore its unity is a given reality which belongs to the very nature of its existence as the one Body of the one Lord.

In developing this theme the author devotes a major section of the book to a detailed study of the messianic expectations of Israel and their fulfilment in Jesus, a fulfilment characterized by a radical departure from popular ideas in His choice of the messianic role of the suffering servant of the Lord. As such He suffered, died, and rose again on behalf of all mankind and thus became the representative and head of the new humanity reconciled to God which is the Church.

It is against the background of the redeeming work of Christ which He accomplished, not on behalf of Himself but on behalf of the "many," on behalf of humanity, that the unity of Christ and His Church and its consequent unity in Him is to be understood. Just as Adam is the representative and head of the old humanity in its situation of sin and death so Christ is the representative and head of the new humanity restored in Him to righteousness and life. To be in Adam is to be in the body of sin and death, the old humanity. To be in Christ is to be in the body of righteousness and life, the new humanity, the Body of Christ which is the Church.

In the deepest sense, therefore, to say that the Church is the Body of Christ is not simply to affirm that it is the community of those who believe in Him, the body of which He is the Head. Rather it is to say that the Church is Christ Himself as the all-inclusive representative and life of the new humanity established in Him. "In order to understand this relationship between Christ and His disciples we must first rid ourselves of our customary individualistic presuppositions which posit Christ as one individual and the disciples as others distinct from Him. No, Christ is the whole and

the disciples participate in Him" (p. 92). And the participation of the Church in Christ is a real participation through His presence in Word and Sacrament by which means He communicates Himself to His people. Because the Church is nothing without Christ, because Christ is Himself the essence of the Church, Nygren affirms: "The Church is Christ as He is present among and meets us upon earth after His resurrection" (p. 96). Such is the indissoluble connection between Christ and His Church and the fundamentally Christological nature of the Church's life.

Since the objective reality of Christ is so entirely the basis and content of the Church's existence its unity is a given fact which belongs to the very nature of its life. The unity may be marred and distorted by schism and heresy but cannot be destroyed by them simply because it is not dependent upon men but upon Christ Himself. In a real way the Church is one in Him. Nygren believes that once this fact is accepted with more than the formal recognition so common today the ecumenical task will take an entirely new direction and give promise of more fruitful issue. For then the ecumenical encounter will cease to be mainly a matter of mutual judgment of one another and become a sharing in love of the riches of Christ to the end that all may grow up together into His fulness. Then controversy itself which should be recognized as a sign of life within the Church would become a means of building up the one Body of Christ through the truth of the gospel.

The reading of this book can only lead to the conclusion that here is a really significant and positive contribution to the cause of true ecumenicity. Reformed churchmen may have reservations regarding certain expressions which the author uses in affirming that the unity of Christ and His Church can be said to reach the point of identity while agreeing with the sense in which he makes the affirmation. There should be complete agreement with the basic thesis that the Church is a Christological reality and that Christ Himself is the essence of its life. And in the light of the frustrations and apparently insoluble problems encountered by the ecumenical movement Bishop Nygren in this book has surely pointed to the road by which the Church may move forward to a fuller understanding and expression of the unity which it has in Christ.

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The Visible Words of God; An Exposition of the Sacramental Theology of Peter Martyr Vermigli, A.D. 1500-1562. By Joseph C. McLelland. Edinburgh & London: Oliver and Boyd (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Co.), 1957. Pp. ix, 291. $4.25.

The work starts with a biographical portrait of the reformer who was born in Italy in the year 1500 and lived there until 1542 when he had to

escape to Switzerland. In the same year he went to Strassburg to become professor in the field of Old Testament. From 1547-1553 we find him at Oxford where he had been called by Archbishop Cranmer. In 1553 he returned to his former position in Strassburg where he remained until 1556. In that year he left for Zurich where he died in 1562.

After this biographical section (pp. 1-68) the author gives an exposition of Peter Martyr's theology of the Sacraments in three parts. The first part deals with the presuppositions and is called "Revelation and Sacrament." Christology is the basis of theology for Martyr. Revelation, as in John Calvin's thought, means divine condescension and accommodation. Revelation is analogical in nature: it leads to faith, not to sight, to analogy, not to identity (p. 76). Analogy implies both likeness and difference. It is not based on ontological continuity between God and man as is the doctrine of the *analogia entis*, but on the *unio hypostatica* of God and man in the Person of Jesus Christ (p. 83). Scripture and the Sacraments are forms of the Word of God. Not by reason, but by the light of the Holy Spirit do we understand the meaning of the words of the Bible and the Sacraments. The *sursum corda* is the answer to the divine condescension and is worked by the Holy Spirit in the hearts of men.

Christ himself is the one and central sacrament. In this light Martyr explains the Old Testament analogically. Christ is the archetype and the head of his members before and after (p. 93). He is the meaning of the Old and the New Testament "signs." If we take the hypostatic union of the divine and human nature in Christ as archetype we will not go wrong in the understanding of the sacraments. Transubstantiation and consubstantiation are forms of the Eutychean heresy as in both doctrines the divine and the human are confused. Chalcedon ("without confusion or separation") is also valid for the nature of bread and wine in relationship to the Christ whom they signify (p. 102). The communication of properties is not ontological but nominal (*verbalis*) both in the incarnation and in the sacraments.

In the second part, called "Union with Christ," the author deals with Martyr's ideas of Baptism as the sacrament of regeneration and the Eucharist as the Sacrament of communication in the church as the mystical Body of Christ. In the church Christ makes us "bone of His bone and flesh of His flesh" (p. 123). The church is a sacramental relationship. The church continues the ministry of Christ both with words and with their seals, the sacraments, "which are certain visible words." This definition of Augustine is often quoted by Martyr and used by the author as the title of his book. The sacrament is the seal to the invisible word of the forgiveness of sins (p. 133). The Word in the sacrament is the signifying power. Both Word and Sacrament require faith which is worked by the Holy Spirit.

Baptism for Martyr is the sacrament of being grafted into Christ. It is the sacrament of the Covenant promise. It is the sign and seal of our

justification by faith. The effect of Baptism is *Christoformia*, Christ's growth in us (p. 147). This fruit extends over the whole life. Baptism is a corporate act by which the whole church benefits (p. 157).

While Baptism is the sacrament of union with Christ, the Eucharist is that of communion with the risen Lord. In it the same union is fed. Faith is the one instrument from the human side for union with Christ. "To drink is to believe." Christ's presence is sacramental, in the mode of faith. Martyr rejects all "Christ-absent" sacramental teaching (p. 165). We are changed so that the eyes of our mind effectively touch him. The presence of Christ's flesh is one of faith. The movement is one of ascent and descent: *sursum corda* and the power and virtue of the risen Christ pervading the lives of his people. This spiritual presence of Christ's risen humanity renews the whole man, both body and flesh (p. 175).

In the third part of his work, called "Real Presence and True Sacrifice," the author first deals with Martyr's rejection of the doctrine of transubstantiation. Although he uses philosophical arguments, his main point is the Christological analogy. Martyr speaks of a spiritual or sacramental mutation of the elements. "As we are changed into Christ, so is bread changed into the body of Christ" (p. 195). For the eyes of faith bread and wine are used by the Holy Spirit to signify both the mystical Body and the Body of Christ Himself, but the nature of bread remains unchanged. He rejects the *manducatio infidelium*, the teaching that the unfaithful eat the real body of Christ, because he cannot see how the Body of Christ can be divorced from his Spirit. In Chapter VIII the author gives Martyr's view of the doctrine of ubiquity, the teaching that the risen human nature of Christ is omnipresent. Also here Martyr sees the Eutychean heresy emerge with the confusion of the two natures. Martyr's great interest is to preserve the true humanity of the risen Lord as he is our "first fruits." On the other hand Martyr rejects the doctrine that the sacraments are mere signs and that the Eucharist is merely reminiscent of Christ's death (Chapter IX on "The Eucharist and Tropism"). In the final chapter, called "The Eucharistic Sacrifice," the author describes how Martyr called the Eucharist a sacrifice. It is not a propitiatory sacrifice, for this was completed in the death of Christ, but a sacrifice of thanksgiving offered up by the people who render to God their praise, their thanks and their lives.

Among the appendices is an interesting historical treatise on Martyr's relationship with Bucer and Calvin.

This book, the first one to appear on Martyr in the English language, is a fine contribution to the history of theological thought. At the same time it stimulates contemporary theological thinking as the author suggests in several places. For these reasons the work is very useful for all who are interested in theology. It is an excellent introduction to the profound wealth of thinking of the reformers on the sacraments. This thinking is positive rather than negative. Martyr is a reformer who influenced theolo-

gical thought both on the continent of Europe and in the British Isles. His ideas show what these churches and their offshoots have in common. He was unable to come to an agreement with the Lutherans and he had to leave Strassburg for this reason. The agreement between the Church of South India today with the Lutheran church there on the "real presence" of Christ at the Lord's Supper is a more hopeful sign. These churches in rethinking the problem may have gained more appreciation for the motives behind the Lutheran doctrine of the ubiquity and behind the so called *Extra-Calvinisticum*, with its presupposition: *Finitum non est capax infiniti.* A suggestion in this direction is also made by Barth in his *Kirchliche Dogmatik* (II, I, pp. 548-551) where he asserts that the presence is the real presence of the whole Christ with his divine and human nature even if spiritual and sacramental. Not only Eutyches with his confusion of the two natures is a danger but also Nestorius with his separation of the two. Nevertheless, Martyr's warning to stress the real humanity of the risen Lord can only be neglected at the expense of losing the eschatological hope, that we may see Him as He is and that ultimately we may fully share in his glorified humanity.

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Faith and Knowledge; a Modern Introduction to the Problem of Religious Knowledge. By JOHN HICK. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press (Toronto: Thos. Allen, Ltd.), 1957. Pp. xix, 221. $3.75.

PROFESSOR HICK begins by distinguishing between two kinds of faith: *fides* and *fiducia*, or faith as *cognition* and faith as *trust*. In the Bible faith is interpreted very largely as trust. This presupposes, however, some sort of cognition of God. The author also distinguishes between faith as understood in Scholasticism, with a strong emphasis on propositions as the vehicle of revelation, and faith as understood by the Reformers who find "the *locus* of revelation" in history rather than in language, in events rather than in propositions. In either case revelation is always the correlate of faith.

One of the interesting debates in the theological world today centers around the neo-orthodox denial of continuity between revelation and reason, faith and philosophy. Dr. Hick is opposed to the neo-orthodox position on this matter and in this book he attempts "an epistemological study of religious faith."

Knowledge is defined as "direct and infallible acquaintance with 'reality' or 'truth.' " The author also apparently gives some place to intuition in the field of knowledge (p. 21). For him faith is "analysis of the belief-situation."

This analysis of faith is fourfold: the entertainment of propositions; the assent to propositions; the disposition to act; and an emotion of conviction.

In Chapter Three the author refers to voluntarist theories of faith as set forth by William James, F. R. Tennant and others. His conclusion is that though faith is an activity of the whole person and, therefore, has a volitional aspect, nevertheless it is insufficient from the religious standpoint to interpret faith in terms of grand assumptions or suppositions. "Religious faith is absolute and implicit belief; the articles of a creed are not merely provisional assumptions" (p. 68).

The author deals briefly with "Faith and the Moral Order" in Chapter Four, referring especially to the position of D. M. Baillie that faith "is a conviction arising out of the moral consciousness." He then passes to a consideration of "Faith and the Illative Sense." In his use of the term "illative" the author follows J. H. Newman and defines it as "our capacity to see a large field of evidence as a whole and to divine its significance" (p. 96). Dr. Hick shows that some of the most reasonable certainties in life have not been arrived at by a process of logical analysis. He writes: " . . . the reasoning by which we arrive at many, perhaps most, of the certainties by which we live, does not consist in acquiring Cartesian 'clear and distinct ideas' and perfectly cogent chains of reasoning, but rather in appreciating the drift of a miscellaneous mass of evidence" (p. 95).

In the next two Chapters on "The Nature of Faith" and "The Logic of Faith" the author comes to the heart of the problem. He claims that religious knowledge is unique but "its basic epistemological pattern is that of all our knowledge" (p. 111). Does not this uniqueness, however, require some distinct epistemological pattern if we are to have true religious knowledge? Is not this uniqueness of the revelation in Jesus Christ at least part of the basis of the neo-orthodox claim that there is discontinuity between revelation and reason? The author states that "to know God is not simply to know one more being who inhabits this universe." Granted! But if so, can the ordinary epistemological pattern "of all our knowing" be sufficient to give us knowledge of God? We do not need to belong to the neo-orthodox school of theology to see that this school has raised some very pertinent questions respecting the relation between revelation and reason.

The last two Chapters on "Faith and Freedom" and "Christian Faith" are an amplification of the author's main position respecting our knowledge of God.

Students in philosophy of religion will be well acquainted with Paul Tillich's system of correlation whereby he relates revelation to reason, the divine to the human. In a more restricted field Dr. Hick endeavours to set forth his own system of correlation. Whether he has succeeded in his endeavours will depend, in part, on the reader's theological point of view. However it is the conviction of the present reviewer that such philosophies of correlation do not seriously wrestle with the human predicament of sin

which vitiates all attempts of man to know God, the high and holy One who inhabits eternity. There is only one Mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus, who, by the gift of faith, makes possible for man a true knowledge of God. The uniqueness not only of the source of religious knowledge but also of the means of apprehending this knowledge leads us to raise questions about all philosophies of correlation. The religious knowledge gained by methods of correlation is more likely to be knowledge of some immanentist or pantheistic deity than knowledge of the true God who is uniquely revealed in Jesus Christ.

This is not a book for the amateur; but for those who are acquainted with the field of religious philosophy it brings a fresh approach to the problem of "Faith and Knowledge."

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Essays in Liberality. By ALEC R. VIDLER. London: S.C.M. Press (Toronto: Ryerson Press), 1957. Pp. 189. $3.00.

IN THIS CENTURY, characteristic religious outlooks have been extreme in kind—whether that of biblical literalism, or of cynical criticism, of bigoted orthodoxy, or of vague generalization, of fanatical hatred, or of breezy humanism. The result has been that many thoughtful lay people, if not completely indifferent, are at least very much confused as to the significance of Christianity in the modern world.

Dr. Vidler, the new Dean of King's College, Cambridge, is sincerely concerned to face this problem. The scepticism of the nineteenth century Liberal has either watered down the Faith to the level of an emotional outlet, or on the other hand, it has made it a matter only for the expert, like any other scientific truth. In reaction, many resort to an extremely authoritarian point of view, but the author feels that in reaction to Liberalism, Christians must keep a sense of balance and perspective by practising the ancient virtue of *liberality*.

These Essays in Liberality, written over a period of some years, cover a wide variety of subjects such as "Freedom and Responsibility," "History According to the Bible," "The Welfare State," and "The Appalling Religiousness of America." They are united under the one theme of the need for liberality, which characterizes "the man who is tolerant, not because he regards all opinions as doubtful, but because he knows that God alone is true,—the man who is ready to learn from all men, not because he has no creed of his own, but because his creed assures him that God is teaching and chastening all men,—the man who has plumbed the meaning for the human intellect of the great New Testament word about having nothing and yet possessing all things,—the man who can at once rigorously doubt

and sincerely believe,—in short the man who has discovered that it is not only the sinner but the doubter who is justified by faith" (p. 28). The author suggests that liberality is perhaps best seen in a traditional Anglican outlook.

Though critical of certain matters in the theology of the late Bishop Gore, Dr. Vidler would apparently describe his point of view by the same title as the late Bishop Gore chose for himself—that is Liberal Catholic. One might well ask why there should be any need to use the word Liberal in the context at all. The word Catholic with its rich associations certainly suggests not a mere conformism but a true orthodoxy which reaches back in history but which also reaches out to every man in every part of the world. There are a number of Anglicans who use the title "Liberal Catholic" and one suspects them at times of being more Liberal than Catholic on some basic dogmas of the Faith. Does comprehension necessitate (as the author suggests that it should with reference to the late Dr. Rashdall) a sufferance of those who hold extremely unorthodox views? In his essay on "What is Anglicanism?" Dr. Vidler describes it as a "Church of Reconciliation"—reconciling Catholic and Protestant, Eastern and Western traditions and also the age-long faith with new discoveries and modes of thought. Yet one wonders if this principle of comprehension, even in its most profound sense, is the real heart of Anglicanism or if there is not an even more positive theology at its root.

The appeal of this book is to Christian intellectuals, not theologians, living in England. For many of them there and elsewhere this book will undoubtedly be an inspiration. Perhaps the most significant essay in the book is the concluding one on "The Obedience of a Christian Intellectual." There are many devout Christians serving on the faculties of universities in this country and too often the Church does not give them support and encouragement in their peculiar responsibilities as Christians.

A theology of liberality may seem to many a rather complacent theme in the light of the dreadful problems of this age, and yet in the face of so much "uncommon nonsense" proclaimed in the name of Christ, one cannot but welcome the sound common sense which characterizes these essays.

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Of Men and Angels. By WESLEY SHRADER. New York: Rinehart and Company (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin), 1957. Pp. 184. $2.95.

MANY NEW WORKS in the field of Pastoral Psychology, or Pastoral Care have appeared in this decade. Some expound methods of counselling, others the "art" of ministering to the needy, while others enlarge upon the social

or theological implications of personal maladjustments. Most of these publications imply that the gifted and interested reader, learning something new, can become a more effective minister or pastor. *Of Men and Angels* is different inasmuch as the Associate Professor of Pastoral Theology at Yale Divinity School writes with knowledge gained from lengthy experience in a ministry marked by "counselling activities" of the problems, perplexities, and dilemmas faced in this specialized area, but without apparently seeking to have others accept his methods or techniques.

In twenty years of meeting people in their hour of need Wesley Shrader must have met with, interviewed, and counselled hundreds of people. His obvious knowledge and experience must have resulted in many "successes," but concerning these he writes little. In this small, well written, and delightfully presented volume he presents seventeen cases introducing such social problems as suicide, murder, prostitution, seduction, neurosis, and psychosis, from a social milieu including the banker and the gambler, the millionaire and the pauper, the teacher and the tramp. In a dramatic and easy style he successfully demonstrates the wide bounds of the Christian ministry, and the possibilities of effective counselling. However, the reader is never in doubt as to the author's aim to indicate clearly the difficulties, dangers, and frustrations inherent in ministerial counselling. He freely advertizes personal limitations, and his own lack of answers to many problems. This is a courageous presentation. Few ministers—and Dr. Shrader takes pains to emphasize his vocation—would be willing after so many years in the ministry to indicate that a person counselled later committed suicide, or murdered a life's partner, or that one had entertained and in total unawareness been completely fascinated by a psychopathic killer, who within a few hours killed an innocent citizen. Moreover he bravely introduces subjective responses of the minister that can even outweigh the factually obvious.

The material contained in this book and the status of its author assure its acceptance by many. Ministers and laity alike from many areas of life will be captivated by its contents. An uninitiated reader, however, may well be faced with unforeseen difficulties by too ready an acceptance of the theories and techniques mentioned, even though the author clearly warns against any such acceptance. The clinically orientated and well trained minister may well be encouraged to accept more freely his own limitations and personal inability to help many who find their way into his office. The inexperienced and only partially trained person may be tempted to follow the author's eclectic approach, and in counselling situations tend to "diagnose" by the most convenient personality theory, or tend to adopt, by what would appear to be mere intuition, some convenient counselling method. A person of extensive knowledge and mature experience may exercise much freedom of action, but the novice might not only endanger himself, but also harm others.

The work is marked by generalizations which can only be excused by the

author's autobiographical presentation. He maintains that the alcoholic is a child and that his emotional arrestment occurs at an early age. This may well be an opinion accepted by many, but there are other equally weighty opinions. In counselling methods he speaks of the "shock method," "indirection," and the "questioning method;" but the terms are inadequately defined, and these methods as presented are obviously interchangeable. No attention is paid to the interpersonal contributions made by the counsellor, although the author readily admits his own personal emotional involvement with those whom he interviews. It might be well to recognize that this admission neither excuses nor justifies such involvement which may well be the cause of many counselling difficulties and problems.

Theologically some mention is made of the doctrines of original sin and of the unpardonable sin in relation to personality disturbances. The value of the Christian teaching on forgiveness to the guilty and distressed person with a religious background is indicated. But it would seem that much more should have been included concerning the Christian ground on which the Christian must firmly stand. This is a useful volume especially when read in the context of the many books now available in the field of Pastoral Care. On the other hand, mere personal experience, and a descriptive presentation unrelated to a core of basic assumptions or an accepted philosophy or doctrine of man may create unnecessary difficulties for many readers.

MAURICE FLINT

Toronto, Ontario

Personality and Religion. By PAUL E. JOHNSON. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1957. Pp. 297. $4.50.

THIS BOOK is concerned with the most pertinent of all subjects, "What am I and how did I get this way?" It is not a new theme; it is the substance of the inquiry by the philosophers, psychologists, and theologians of all ages. But these learned men are giving expression to what every thinking person has wondered, if only for a fleeting moment before turning away again in fright from the mystery of his existence. The book is concerned with theories of personality and viewpoints in the study of the self, and eventually arrives "at a dimensional view of personality seeking to integrate the partial theories into a unity of relationships. This may be called neo-personalism, or as we have designated it, dynamic inter-personalism."

The first part of the book is a study of the mystery of personality and traces the development of the self from infancy to maturity when the self is confronted with the problem of how to maintain the integrity of a personality and yet conform to the pattern of the world and be accepted and approved by society. The second part is concerned with how the

religious person resolves this problem by establishing right relationships to the environment, both personal and impersonal, so that he achieves a security which does not prejudice his unique personality. "A religious person, in the true sense, is not one who accepts his limitations in weak resignation, or nurses a martyr complex by insisting his sufferings are the crown of enduring to the end the person he was at the beginning. Rather, he is the one who is devoted to the cause of eternal growth and willing to suffer in order to fulfill a greater destiny." "Religious experiences may well be seen as a relationship of I and Thou" (p. 113). The author then goes on to elaborate the fundamental attributes of reverence for life and the sense of belonging to something more important than oneself which gives meaning to life. The new interest in and emphasis upon religion is a recognition of man's feeling of aloneness in the vast universe and the need to overcome this isolation in life.

The most valuable part of the book will be found in the chapters devoted to case histories. The significant events in the life of Jeanne Andrews, Dorothy Strong, Talat Khalil and Anton Boison illustrate dramatically how people out of such varied backgrounds as a windswept Nebraska village and a town in Upper Egypt have the same basic problems—the feeling of rejection, the unconscious influence for good or evil by parents and friends, the struggle for existence, the sense of failure, the breakdown of physical and mental health—and how out of these frustrations they finally achieve a sense of wholeness. In these accounts of the lives of four people we see many of the common problems which confront everyone in the desire to become a real person.

Some will be disappointed that the book does not present more positively the significance of Christ as the one who is the Way, the Truth and the Life, but this defect should not becloud the merit of the book as a small contribution for all who must deal with the complex problems of religious experience and personality both in their own lives and in the lives of others.

Kenneth MacLean Glazier

Toronto, Ontario

Unity in the Faith. By William Porcher DuBose. Edited by W. Norman Pittenger. Greenwich: The Seabury Press (Toronto: Oxford University Press), 1957. Pp. xii, 243. $3.00.

This book constitutes an important last chapter in the published work of William Porcher Du Bose by collecting his eleven final essays into a single volume. The essays appeared originally in the years between 1913 and 1920 in *The Constructive Quarterly*, a pioneering ecumenical journal now

no longer published. Although they appeared separately, Du Bose evidently intended them to stand together as they appear in the present book, but was prevented by his death in 1918 from seeing them through to publication in that form. Professor Pittenger has now done this, added an earlier and long out-of-print article on "Christian Defense," and supplied a careful and generously appreciative essay on the significance of Du Bose's theology.

The name "Du Bose" is unfortunately not so familiar to the present generation of Canadian and American theological students that it needs no introduction, though his survey of the history of doctrine in the conciliar period, *The Ecumenical Councils*, and his primary theological work, *The Soteriology of the New Testament*, may not be unknown. Du Bose was born in 1836 in South Carolina, fought for the Confederacy in the War between the States, was ordained in the Episcopal Church, came in 1870 as chaplain to the then newly re-organized University of the South at Sewanee, Tennessee, and was later its professor of Ethics, and Dean of the School of Theology, the founding of which he had done much to implement. From 1892 until his death he produced a whole series of books which, as one of his American reviewers said, "thoughtful people were glad to read."

Du Bose's theological activity, while it was noted with approval by such American scholars as F. C. Grant, had its most significant response in England, where William Sanday in particular was a strong advocate, and in France, where the Abbé Bremond remarked, "No other English writer has been of such help in this century." Du Bose's primary contribution to theology was in the area of soteriology, which he attempted to rethink in terms of the categories of personality. He was one of the very first theologians to try to read the total pattern of Christian faith by means of the new psychological method. His specific contribution to the doctrine of the Atonement, referred to by J. K. Mozley in his study of this subject, is of the same order, both in nature and in excellence, as that of R. C. Moberly in his classic *Atonement and Personality*, and was indeed preferred by Sanday to Moberly.

The present book offers excellent material for a re-evaluation of an original and interesting American theologian, one of the very few who belong completely to this continent. Appreciation of Du Bose has been long in coming. This collection of his last essays, in terms of which we are afforded a kind of summary of his work and can see the man "whole," is published in honor of the Centennial Celebration of the University of the South, which Du Bose served so long. In addition to the theological essay by the editor, there is a good biographical reminiscence by Dr. George B. Myers of Sewanee, a student and friend of Du Bose, and a foreword by Dr. Edward McCready, present Vice-Chancellor of the University.

The publication of the book is a fitting way for that institution to honor its most distinguished teacher. For these essays strike me as rather more than an important and hitherto neglected item in the history of theology—

and particularly in the history of the ecumenical movement—in America. They are quite astonishing in their freshness and vividness and possess an intrinsic excellence which makes them a valuable contribution to contemporary theological discussion in their own right.

WILLIAM M. RALSTON

Trinity College
Toronto, Ontario

Principles of Christian Worship; with Special Reference to the Free Churches. By RAYMOND ABBA. London (Toronto): Oxford University Press, 1957. Pp. xiii 196. $2.25.

I CAN warmly commend this book to all ministers, and especially to theological students in their last year of preparation for ordination. Indeed, it might well serve as a text book in theological colleges. Written mainly by a Free Churchman for Free Churchmen—the author is a Congregational minister and was formerly Principal of Camden College, Sydney, N.S.W.—nonetheless, from both an historical and a practical point of view, it will be found absorbingly interesting and helpful to ministers and clergy of all denominations who are concerned about dignity and order as important contributory factors in achieving the atmosphere in which the public worship of God can be reverently conducted. To quote the author's own words, "In our ministerial training—admirable enough in Biblical Exegesis, Church History, Systematic Theology and Homiletics—there has been an almost complete neglect of Liturgics . . . not until our ministers receive an adequate liturgical training will our worship be worthy of our own great traditions." This book, read and digested, and its principles put into practice, will go far toward remedying that serious defect.

The various chapters indicate the scope of the book; Basic Principles; Origins and Development; The Ministry of the Word; Public Prayer; Church Praise; the Sacraments. There is also appended a most useful list of books for further reading. This is a book to which one can turn with absorbed interest again and again. It is well worth its price.

Incidentally, the United Church Book of Common Order is given "honourable mention," particularly the orders of service for the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper. On one point only the author failed to carry his reviewer with him and that is in regard to his critical references to prepared bread and the use of individual communion cups. If we are to appeal to historical tradition, might we not have to go back to the *agape* itself? Can that be done in terms of the very large communion services held in many churches? Is there really a difference in principle between one or two or many more pieces of bread and one or more chalices? I cannot myself see

any such difference. Moreover, is it necessarily "a jarring note" to drink the cup simultaneously? Having experienced both modes, I must say that I have found the one just as reverent and moving as the other. Moreover the corporate act of drinking together meets the point made by Dr. John Oman whom the author quotes with approval as follows: "I have often been puzzled about what makes a service worship. It does not depend either upon having a liturgy or wanting it. It does not depend on the sincerity or even the piety of the minister. More and more I come to think that it depends on worshipping with the congregation, and not merely conducting that worship." Given this spirit of devotion in individual worshippers, then with the help of liturgics, corporate worship can be not only dignified and beautiful but edifying and reverent. Again, I most sincerely commend this book to all who are concerned with the conduct of the public worship of God.

JOHN SHORT

Toronto, Ontario

Books Received

(Inclusion of title in this list neither ensures nor precludes subsequent review in this journal.)

ADAMS, S. M. *Sophocles the Playwright* (*The Phoenix: Supplementary* Volume III). Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1957. Pp. ix, 182. $4.75.

ADDLESHAW, G. W. O. *Lectionaries Old and New.* London: S.P.C.K. (Toronto: Anglican Book Centre), 1957. Pp. 22. $0.40.

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CRAGG, E. *Protestant Faith and Life* (*The Saddlebag Series*). Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1958. Pp. 58. $1.00.

CUSHMAN, R. E. *Therapeia: Plato's Conception of Philosophy.* Chapel Hill: Univ. of N. Car. Press, 1958. Pp. xxii, 322. $6.00.

DAVIES, G. *Essays on the Later Stuarts.* San Marino, Calif.: The Huntington Library, 1958. Pp. ix, 133. $4.00.

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EBBUTT, A. J. *The Life, the Question and the Answer: Fifteen Questions about the Life of Jesus.* Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1957. Pp. xiv, 170. $2.50 (Paper binding $1.50).

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